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THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

At Antietam and Gettysburg

By WILLIAM E. SPEAR

The thinnest part of the wave is the white-cap that crests its moving

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INTRODUCTION.

THE first battle of Bull Run, fought on July 21, 1861, was in response to the urgent demand of the North that something should be done; that a move should be made toward the accomplishment of the object for which Mr. Lincoln had called out the militia "of the several States of the Union to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand men. . . . The first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places and property which have been seized from the Union." The men came in response to this call, for the North was the party making it and Mr. Lincoln was the herald of the proclamation. There was an expectancy in the men who came, and in the communities from which they came, that they would at once "repossess the forts, places and property which have been seized from the Union." Their going "to the War" was greeted with acclaim; their route thither was vibrant with enthusiasm; each of these volunteers was the representative of the community from which he came; they spoke his name with praise, for he was carrying out their will; they watched his steps with interest; his vacant place on the farm, in the store, in the factory, in the lumbering

regions, in the classroom, in the professions, was accounted for in a sentence full of pride—"he has gone to the War"; his efficiency in the place he had held as a civilian was set up as the standard of his efficiency as a soldier; even traits of disorderliness or recklessness were interpreted into qualities especially adaptable to military functions; for it was not then sensed, as it was afterwards demonstrated, that peace is the best preparation for war, and that the homely habits of thrift, industry and carefulness make better soldiers than unthinking obedience to authority or rough and brutal sports. The North, ready and impatient by instinct and training to act, had carried out its impulse along the lines suggested; it now wanted its representatives to act along the same lines, i.e.: "to repossess the forts, places and property which have been seized from the Union." It was like a farmer who lends a "hand" or a tool to a neighbor, and is chagrined to learn that while keeping the "hand" or the tool, to the detriment of the lender, the borrower is not using that which has been lent. This demand of the North was logical—a soldier enlists to fight; an army is assembled for the sole purpose of killing others, and the sooner it begins its work of destruction the nearer it is to the impulse that prompts, and to the object of its organization. The ball, the powder and the target must be in conjunction. The battle of

Bull Run would have taken place no matter who commanded the army, and no matter whether the commander wanted it or not (as a matter of fact, he did not want it). The people never ask any one's opinion as to what they shall do. If the commander did not want it, it was because he was not in touch with the spirit of the North, and he would use the stock phrases of his profession to hinder and delay movements; if he did want it, he would substitute action for argument. The slogan "On to Richmond" was in the air, as in '97 it was "On to Havana." It was probably first uttered by some shouter in the streets, who spoke aloud what every one was thinking about, and whose common sense and practical way of at least making a start crept slowly into the skull of inactive respectability and intrenched laziness. That shouter was the real initiator of the movement; he pointed out the thing to do, he saw the "strategic point," which was a throat—to clutch—and that is the gist of war. The formal orders directing the movements of the army were of course made in accordance with strict military tailorship—the tailorship department of popular movements is always on the alert and working overtime to direct, precedents being remodelled and readjusted to fit the movements, as the cast-off clothing of the elder son is changed to fit the new-born. The resolution, then, existing, the time when a battle will take

place is as little dependent on one man or coterie of men, as the resolution itself; for the mass-movement is on; there must be a battle within three months from the time when the first troops were called, for their time of service then expires. Within this time the battle takes place.

The incidents of this engagement; the momentous (?) change of the word "communications" into "communication," either by the sleepy General Scott or by some member of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, in the plan of McDowell when laid before them for approval; the march of the army to Bull Run; the confusion accompanying its going—a confusion no more marked on this occasion than generally; the march of the troops through the woods to Sudley Springs to turn the Confederate left; the belching of batteries and their capture; the failure of Patterson in not foreseeing what no one foresaw; the standing of Jackson's brigade so firmly as to attract the attention of a Confederate officer, whose compliment to Jackson's men was applied to himself, and became his soubriquet; the confusion and scattering of the Union troops;—all of these things were like the tossing houses, the drifting bodies, the utensils and furniture of housekeeping. The lifeless forms and raised arms, the confused masses of animals that appear when a mass of water rushing from a broken dam engulfs every-

thing in its flow are not the flood — they but mark its fury and its progress; back of all these are the single drops of water long accumulated in an irresistible mass so soon as an opening is made for its passage. So back of every gun and soldier in blue was the war-cry of the city or hamlet from which he came; the lint-gatherers, and the stocking-makers; the war-songs around the hearth and at public gatherings; the devices on envelopes and paper; the public prints, the orators' periods, the ministers' prayers, and the war-light in the eyes of old men, women and children. Do not confound the wave with that which floats on its surface.

A brief review of the circumstances and events leading up to and impelling the movements of the Army of Northern Virginia into Maryland, June, 1862, shows McClellan with the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula; at one time as near Richmond as Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, but now at Harrison's Landing. His army so near to Richmond is a great threat. Every one in that city knows the danger from this quarter. While this danger from McClellan exists, word is brought that Pope with another army is threatening the city from another direction. The danger from Pope is, however, more imminent, for though his army is smaller, he is aiming to destroy a railroad which is furnishing the city with food—of which there is

a great scarcity—while between McClellan and Richmond are strong fortifications and almost impassable breastworks. To stop this imminent danger from Pope, what is to be done? What is done when a blow is aimed at one's head? The arm is put up to ward off the blow; the instinct of self-preservation asserts itself; and it is this instinct that leads to the sending of troops to protect this railroad and, if possible, drive away Pope. Jackson is sent; that he goes with the "pomp and circumstance" of war, and in response to a command—perhaps carried by an orderly—does not take the act out of the realm of the natural or common, or put it into the domain of "military genius." From the meeting of Jackson and Pope in the vicinity of Gordonsville follows that series of accidents terminating in the second battle of Bull Run, where the giant forces of war—hunger, murder, hatred and revenge—play with the pigmy man as forest fires with shrubs; and, while the causes of a railroad accident in a time of peace, a thousand-fold less pronounced and terrible, shock communities and provoke the harshest criticism and invective against the greed of those whose self-interest would be assumed to lead to the most practicable means to avoid such disasters, and are persistently and carefully investigated with a view to secure safety in the future, here wholesale butcheries, involving thousands killed and

wounded, are by the unthinking multitude attributed to the want of skill or bravery in the defeated commander on the one hand, and on the other hand to the wonderful acumen of the successful one.

Do not be impatient, reader, if ever seized with a curiosity to study the movements of these two armies from Cedar Mountain to the plains of Manassas, if you find no more intelligence than in the movements of a thunderbolt, an earthquake or a flood. Consult in your perplexity some historian, or better still some biographer—whose data are collected from the reports of his leader and his followers—who will show you how the foot of every limping soldier, mysteriously guided by the prescience of "headquarters," in its downward movement always struck a grassy plot and never once a sharp stone; how every step of objectless marching and every objectless delay had been timed to the carrying out of a "plan"; how the transit of every whizzing shell was mathematically measured and its destructive agency determined; how, to produce the proper dramatic effect, his hero, like Richelieu grasping his iron sword, will in the midst of battle sight a cannon (so unfortunate for the enemy that he did not sight them all!); how the soldier's ignorance of whether he was advancing or retreating, and the general's ignorance as to whether his retreat was not an advance against an unseen

force was to the former darkness, and to the latter light;—all of these things will be shown as conclusive evidence of his paragon's military genius, and the minuteness of the description will be proportioned to his admiration for his commanding hero.

Chapter One.

THE ANTIETAM CAMPAIGN.

That portion of Lee's report on the Antietam Campaign, which covers the period from the entrance of his army into Maryland to the morning of September 19, when, having recrossed the Potomac on the night of the 18th, it rested again on the soil of Virginia, is as follows:

"Northeastern Virginia was freed from the presence of Federal soldiers up to the intrenchments of Washington, and soon after the arrival of the army at Leesburg information was received that the troops which had occupied Winchester had retired to Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg. The war was thus transferred from the interior to the frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts made accessible to our army. To prolong a state of affairs in every way desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations to pass without endeavoring to inflict further injury upon the enemy, the best course appeared to be the transfer of the army into Maryland. Although not properly equipped for invasion, lacking much of the material of war, and feeble in transportation, the troops poorly provided with clothing, and thousands of

them destitute of shoes, it was yet believed to be strong enough to detain the enemy upon the Northern frontier until the approach of winter should render his advance into Virginia difficult, if not impracticable. The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington government to retain all of its available force to provide against contingencies which its course toward the people of that State gave it reason to apprehend. At the same time it was hoped that military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberties. The difficulties that surrounded them were fully appreciated, and we expected to derive more assistance in the attainment of our object from the just fears of the Washington government than from any active demonstration on the part of the people, unless success should enable us to give them assurance of continued protection."

"Influenced by these considerations, the army was put in motion, D. H. Hill's division, which had joined us on the 2d, being in advance, and between September 4 and 7 crossed the Potomac at the fords near Leesburg and encamped in the vicinity of Fredericktown."

"It was decided to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order by threatening Wash-

ington and Baltimore to cause the enemy to withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our communications and the safety of those engaged in the removal of our wounded and the captured property from the late battle-fields. Having accomplished this result, it was proposed to move the army into Western Maryland, establish our communications with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to follow, and thus draw him from his base of supplies. It had been supposed that the advance upon Fredericktown would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the valley. This not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from these positions before concentrating the army west of the mountains. To accomplish this with the least delay, General Jackson was directed to proceed with his command to Martinsburg, and, after driving the enemy from that place, to move down the south side of the Potomac upon Harpers Ferry. General McLaws, with his own and R. H. Anderson's division, was ordered to seize Maryland Heights, on the north side of the Potomac, opposite Harpers Ferry, and Brigadier-General Walker to take possession of Loudon Heights, on the east side of the Shenandoah, where it unites with

the Potomac. These several commands were directed, after reducing Harpers Ferry and clearing the valley of the enemy, to rejoin the rest of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown."

"The march of these troops began on the 10th, and at the same time the remainder of Longstreet's command and the division of D. H. Hill crossed the South Mountain and moved toward Boonsborough. General Stuart, with the cavalry, remained east of the mountains, to observe the enemy and retard his advance."

"A report having been received that a Federal force was approaching Hagerstown from the direction of Chambersburg, Longstreet continued his march to the former place, in order to secure the road leading thence to Williamsport, and also to prevent the removal of stores which were said to be in Hagerstown. He arrived at that place on the 11th, General Hill halting near Boonsborough to prevent the enemy at Harpers Ferry from escaping through Pleasant Valley, and at the same time to support the cavalry.

"The advance of the Federal army was so slow at the time we left Fredericktown as to justify the belief that the reduction of Harpers Ferry would be accomplished and our troops concentrated before they would be called upon to meet it. In that event it had not been intended to oppose its passage through the

South Mountains, as it was desired to engage it as far as possible from its base."

"Under these circumstances, it was determined to retire to Sharpsburg, where we would be upon the flank and rear of the enemy should he move against McLaws, and where we could more readily unite with the rest of the army. This movement was efficiently and skilfully covered by the cavalry brigade of General Fitzhugh Lee, and was accomplished without interruption by the enemy, who did not appear on the west side of the pass at Boonsborough until about eight o'clock on the following morning. The resistance that had been offered to the enemy at Boonsborough secured sufficient time to enable General Jackson to complete the reduction of Harpers Ferry."

The above quotations are taken from the very elaborate report of General Lee, under the heading of "Capture of Harpers Ferry and Operations in Maryland."

It is proposed to show that in all of the movements of this army during this campaign there was no more "plan," conceived and directed by a single guiding intelligence, than is shown in a field which brings forth its natural growths. Now to the task. After the second battle of Bull Run, here is a victorious army, made so, and known to be made so, by the units that compose it. Do not think, because these units acquiesce

in the praise given to their leader for these victories that they thereby waive the right to claim any portion of it for their own efforts; they recognize this praise as the perquisite which custom and system distribute to chiefs.

The subjective results of these victories is exaltation; the living presence of leaders in whom the soldiers have confidence and the presence of soldiers in whom the leaders have confidence result in an aggressive faith. The actual sight of brigades and regiments yielding and giving way before their onward rush; the breaking of ranks before the fire of their batteries; their repulse of attacks; the actual holding in their control cannons; in their hands, guns, bayonets, sabers, canteens, shoes, stockings, watches, money, souvenirs, effects of every kind that had been held by their foes; their possession of clothing, supplies, ammunition that had been forwarded for the use of their enemies—these comprise all of the details that make up the generalizations of congratulatory orders or proclamations. Their deeds were the data from which these congratulatory orders were made; they could see a road once held and marched over by the enemy now held and marched over by them; they could see a position on which was a threatening and formidable battery, and now they stand on that position and caress that battery; this battery and this position are sentient beings to

them; they praise their vigor, their strength, their courage. Do not imagine these men are thinking of "Declarations of Rights," "Ordinances of Secession," "State Rights," "Military Strategy." There is no time for thinking. Figures come trooping into their minds. Events are lived over again: how they came on to the field; how they wheeled into line, or out of line; how they fired by volleys or at will, and with what effect; how they fell behind rocks and trees and hunted for shelter; how strange the queer grimace on the face of one shot, the pallor of another, the rigid, lifeless form stretched out, the clenched hands, the groans; what one of the officers said, how he looked when saying it; their trying to recall just how things happened and their wonder that they escaped death or wounds; their comments after the battle had ceased, "It was the old 4th, or the 6th"; "It was that battery that got 'em at short range"; "It was the old man who did the trick, and we were with him when he did the same thing before in the Valley, on the Peninsula and Cedar Mountain." The whole panorama of that portion of the field that came within their view, and that larger and more spirited portion that living witnesses picture to their imaginations, increase this exaltation, transforming the recruit into a man of war, and accentuating the passions of those inured to service. Henceforth every clump of woods,

every field, every ravine, every stream, every spring will be looked at in its adaptability for warlike purposes; every sound of the bugle will recall the field-calls; every sight of a flag will recall their flag—the banner of an almost unbroken line of victories from this field to this field—and behind all this the wave of the whole Southern impulse and exaltation.

"The victory of the second Manassas had raised the hopes of the South to the highest pitch; there were even men in Richmond who expected that Lee would be dictating peace from Washington the day the news came that he was straggling back across the fords of the Potomac."

Here, then, is this army. What shall it do? There is but one alternative—to fall back on Richmond; and with such an army, impelled with its momentum, and borne by the wave behind it, this can not be done. The shouter again appears, this time in Southern garb, and utters the thought of all, "On to the North." Lee, like the dagger of Macbeth, but marshals the way they are going; he can no more refuse to guide them this way, than the pilot can refuse to put the vessel before the wind when the tempest is raging. The impulse is elemental, and nothing but an elemental force can stay it. It will act directly, and we see the army marching into Maryland by the most direct route, and along the line of least resistance.

Two other potent factors impel this movement and add to this onward wave. The first: Hunger. "The only two subjects that give me any uneasiness are my supplies of ammunition and subsistence. Of the former I have enough for present use, and must await results before deciding to what point I will have additional supplies forwarded. [The question of supplies would seem to be one of the most important points determined on in a "plan."] Of subsistence, I am taking measures to obtain all that this region will afford; but to be able to obtain supplies to advantage in Maryland, I think it important to have the services of some one known to and acquainted with the resources of the country." "Many thousands of the men were illy clad and barefooted. The shoes captured or supplied had been altogether insufficient to keep the army shod, and now they were about to march through a stony country and over turnpike roads. In addition to this the effect of the insufficient food and the green-corn diet of the past week or two was telling in the large number of men weakened by diarrhœa, and other similar complaints, whom a day's march would convert into stragglers. These causes were destined seriously to cripple the Confederate army in its further operations. Want of food and shoes and severe marching had greatly diminished the Confederate numbers."

The second: Clothing. "The troops were poorly provided with clothing and thousands of them destitute of shoes."

"There was not a dead Yankee in all that broad field who had not been stripped of his shoes and stockings, and in numerous cases had been left as naked as the hour he was born. Our barefooted and ragged men had not hesitated to supply their necessities from the garments and equipments of the dead. Ten thousand barefoot or ill-shod stragglers had been left on the other side of the Potomac."

Any one of these motives might account for this movement; together they form a trinity of propulsion. Anywhere but where they are, offers the things they need. Anywhere, where food and clothing can be obtained, means the North toward which they will go. Lee can no more control this movement than a buoy in tidewater, which indicates the direction of the current, can control or direct its flow. It is not the part of common prudence or common sense to venture into an enemy's country without suitable preparation; Lee belonged to the school of strict preparationists, and it is presumed, in summing up his reasons for this movement long after it had taken place, that he presents to the world those most fitted to justify the movement. Of these considerations therefore, set forth as influencing the movement of the army into

Maryland, those relating to food and clothing, being personal and most vital to the units composing that army, must be assumed to be the controlling considerations, all others being but incidental. It is inconceivable, then, to think of any justification for it except that of necessity—a compelling force outside and beyond his will; and this necessity is consonant with the condition and spirit of the army and the spirit of the South, as has been shown in the case of the first battle of Bull Run—the necessity that events compel.

The comedy of errors, acted with such results during the month of August on the soil of Virginia, is now to be re-acted with like results during the month of September, when Lee takes the initiative on the soil of Maryland. Pass on to a further examination of this report. We are to be made acquainted with his reasons "for crossing the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order, by threatening Washington and Baltimore, to cause the enemy to withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our communications and the safety of those engaged in the removal of our wounded and the captured property from the late battle-fields." Of this it may be said that any movements into Maryland, east or west of the Blue Ridge, would be a threat against Baltimore, Washington and Philadelphia—witness the results in this respect of the movements of Lee's army in the following

summer, when he crossed the Potomac *west* of the Blue Ridge, and the search for reasons to sanction the movement shows weariness when it is attempted to show that Washington and Baltimore were threatened in order "to cause the enemy to withdraw from the south bank," etc., for in Lee's letter to Davis, September 8, he says: "I fear that the arms captured on the plains of Manassas, of which ten thousand or twelve thousand were collected at Gainsville, will be lost for want of transportation to remove them." "I fear all the locomotives and cars captured at Bristoe and Manassas have been destroyed either by the enemy or by ourselves." "I fear there was much suffering among the wounded, but it was impossible to prevent it. All the means of transportation at our command were given to Colonel ———, including the wagons, with directions that the wounded must receive the first attention and be sent to Warrenton. Only one regiment of cavalry is now in front of Warrenton, and I fear my necessities will oblige me to withdraw. Unless General ——— can organize a force of sufficient strength to cover that section of country, and advance it, it will be liable to raids from Washington and Alexandria by the enemy's cavalry. It is a risk we must take to use the troops elsewhere."

We come now to Harpers Ferry, with its ten

or twelve thousand men—the only fact in the whole campaign that could be foreseen, the only fact of which the Federal and the Confederate commander had cognizance, the only island in the whole sea of conjecture. It was this fact that finally gave and directed a definite purpose to movements, which, until made with reference to it, had been vague and purposeless. This fact had been treated by both Lee and McClellan with indifference; neither of them considered it of sufficient importance to take the initiative toward it; and Harpers Ferry, as if resentful, taught them how small were their conceptions of realities. Lee "supposed" Miles would evacuate it, and McClellan wanted him to evacuate it in order that Miles' troops might join his. Each wanted the same thing, because each had a vague idea that in some way such a step would contribute to the successful carrying out of his "plans." But how useless to speculate about the seriousness of "plans" that depend, in one case on a "supposition," and in the other case on a "want." It was not the first time in human affairs—whether in war or peace, nor will it be the last time—when the homely fruits of the present, already waiting to be plucked if the hand but be extended, were waived for the vague but glittering promises of glorious visions.

"It had been supposed that the advance upon

Fredericktown would lead to the evacuation of Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg. This not having taken place it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from these positions before concentrating the army west of the mountains." Is a supposition which is merely a conjecture, a surmise, the basis of military science? When an opponent does what one supposes he will do under certain circumstances it is some evidence of the acumen of the supposer; what he will do is simply a mooted question. In the stock market or on the race-track one who acts on "suppositions" is called a "plunger." Pope, in the previous August, supposed that Jackson was retreating, when he was, in fact, drawn up in battle behind that fatal railroad embankment; Kearny, who was killed at Chantilly, supposed the troops in his front, to whom he rode up, were Federals, but they were not, and his supposition cost him his life. Let us imagine that Lee, before crossing the Potomac, had had some conversation with some of his generals, and while thus engaged one of them had mentioned the facts of Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg being in the possession of the enemy, and another had said, "Well, those places will be evacuated upon our advance to Fredericktown." Now it would be quite remarkable if another one of that group, or some orderly, forgetting his place for the moment, had not said, "Well, supposing the

enemy does not evacuate those places, what then?" Contrary, then, to this supposition, Harpers Ferry was not evacuated. "It became necessary to dislodge the enemy from these positions." Why necessary? If there was a necessity for these places to be freed from Federal troops in the event of an invasion of Pennsylvania, the necessity was certainly more urgent in the event of only invading Maryland; and in either event the attack upon and capture of these two places, when Lee was near the mouth of the Monocacy, a short distance from Harpers Ferry, and the danger from the Army of the Potomac remote, seem more sensible than when, farther away and almost in the presence of that army, he divided his forces for this attack. At the risk of being guilty of Lee's *majesté*, we will call this reasoning puerile, and set forth to meet the exigencies of a report. The same conditions existed as to Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg at the time of crossing the Potomac which existed when it was ordered that they should be attacked, except that at the latter time Harpers Ferry was more strongly defended, as White had retreated from Martinsburg to that place with twenty-five hundred men. That no invasion of Pennsylvania was seriously contemplated, of which the possession of either of these two places was a condition precedent, is demonstrated by the fact that no movement was

made to capture them till the order of September 9, and the suggestion of invading Pennsylvania and the order to capture these places were an afterthought, the one to give the color of a war-like purpose to a purposeless march, and the other to obtain munitions of war, food, shoes and clothing, of which Lee's army was in most urgent need. Not only so, but as a matter of military movement no necessity existed for the capture of or attack on either of these places, as in the event of the Confederates retiring to the Shenandoah Valley, of what importance was Martinsburg with its twenty-five hundred men, or Harpers Ferry, miles away from the vicinity of Lee's army? The following is a copy of the order of Lee commanding the attack on these places, so far as pertaining to the route of the troops and their object:

"*Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia*
"September 9, 1862.

"Special Orders, No. 191.

"The army will resume its march to-morrow (from Fredericktown, Md.), taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route to Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday night take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,

capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harpers Ferry. General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt with the reserve, supply and baggage trains of the army. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown he will take the route to Harpers Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harpers Ferry and vicinity. General Walker with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheeks Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudon Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Keys Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as possible, co-operate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear-guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, supply trains, etc., will precede General Hill. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson and McLaws, and with the main body of the cavalry

will cover the route of the army and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind.

"The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood, etc.

"By order of General R. E. Lee."

This order has been the subject of much discussion by military crities, all expressing astonishment that he should have divided his forces at this time when the Army of the Potomac was so near. This astonishment has undoubtedly arisen from their assumption that the movements of this army were directed by intelligence. McClellan did not hesitate to say: "I think Lee has made a gross mistake," but it was not. Lee had no more choice in ordering this movement than McClellan, who knew of this "gross mistake" on September 13, and who was so elated with his knowledge that he wrote to Mr. Lincoln, "I . . . will catch them in their own trap," had in not being able to reap any advantage whatever from his knowledge of the division. Seek to explain this order of Lee's on the ground of "strategy," "military science," "genius," and there is nothing but darkness; let events, hunger,

cold and nakedness get a hearing, and light appears. It is the province of a commander to give orders, he does nothing else; and he orders what is presented to him to order. The army is here at Frederick, the high-water mark of this invasion; its advancing impulse is spent; the hopes of accessions of bodies of Marylanders to its ranks, and uprisings of the people to throw off the "oppressor's yoke" were never lodged in the thinking of this army. They did not know or care at this time whether they were in Maryland or Pennsylvania. But there were some cold facts with which they were intimately acquainted: the houses and shops were closed; there was no disposition to take their money or their credit for food or clothing; signs of antipathy were everywhere seen; the chill of Northern sentiment permeated the atmosphere; the retrospect was one in which the straggler was the prominent object, and that figure was depressing; the nights began to grow cold, and coldness is a non-conductor of enthusiasm; there were no trophies to please the eye; no victories on this new soil to recount; incessant marching, and to what account? Barefooted men and no shoes; thin and ragged garments and no clothing; hunger and no food. What brought them here? It was not Lee's hunger, it was theirs; it was not his bare feet, it was theirs; it was not his nakedness, it was theirs; it was not his exaltation alone,

it was theirs; a country devastated, stripped of everything by war had been left by them for a country new, virgin, full of abundance, and they would have its fruits to stay their hunger and clothing to cover their nakedness. Lee gave the order, for they presented these things to him, not by deputations, not by petitions, not by polite or impolite requests or suggestions, but by their appearance, their hunger and poverty. They present to him now Harpers Ferry with its food and supplies, which before this time had been only a place upon which his speculation had played, and Hagerstown with its stores. They point him to Harpers Ferry—guarded, but containing what they need; they show him Hagerstown—unguarded, but containing what they need. The guarded place requires more men to take it than the unguarded one: one hundred and thirty regiments march to Harpers Ferry, fifty-one to Hagerstown. The army speaks in no uncertain voice through its necessities. It is absurd to think that the collective irritation and unrest of seventy or eighty thousand men—a populace demand—should not find expression in the fiat of one man or a coterie of men, commanders in name; directors of motions, but not of emotions—themselves purposeless and subject to the same environment as the troops of which they are a part. What do these men care for the phrases "crossing the Potomac east of the Blue

Ridge," "threatening Washington and Baltimore," "establishing our communications," "invading Pennsylvania,"—essentially formal, and military fringe and garniture to cover poverty of purpose. What do these men care where the Army of the Potomac is? whether marching slowly or rapidly? "Give us the order to get this food and these supplies at Harpers Ferry, at Martinsburg, at Hagerstown, and when the Army of the Potomac appears we will be there to meet them as we always have been, nay more, we will wrench food even from the Army of the Potomac as we have done before." The army then divides in its quest for food and clothing; instead of one disreputable looter here and there, it becomes multitudinous reputable looters.

Events hurry on. The battle of Turners Gap takes place. General Hill, who commanded the Confederates at this place, says, in an article in *The Century Magazine*, "The battle of South Mountain (Turners Gap) was one of extraordinary illusions and delusions. The Federals were under the self-imposed illusion that there was a very large force opposed to them, whereas there was only one weak division until late in the afternoon (when Longstreet arrived). They might have brushed it aside almost without halting but for this illusion. It was a battle of delusion also; for moving about from point to point and meeting the foe when he presented

himself, the Confederates deluded the Federals into the belief that the whole mountains were swarming with rebels. A little while before this I had seen from the lookout station near the Mountain House the vast army of McClellan spread out before me. The marching columns extended back as far as the eye could see in the distance. It was a grand and glorious spectacle, and it was impossible to look at it without admiration. I had never seen so tremendous an army before, and I did not see one like it afterwards; for though we confronted greater forces at Yorktown, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg and about Richmond under Grant, these were only partly seen, at most a corps at a time. But here four corps were in full view, one of which was on the mountain and almost within rifle range."

General Hill's statement that the Federals were illuded and deluded is undoubtedly correct, but this illusion and delusion—here confined to the Federals—arose from peculiar circumstances, the position of the Confederates on the top of a mountain range, the contour of the ground, and the forests; and his statement is not exceptional, for Hill was too long a soldier and had taken part in too many battles, not to know what all the world knows, that in every battle each of the contestants is in a condition of illusion and delusion—that blindness, with its concomitants, is the rule, and light the exception. The battles



SHARPSBURG AND THE SURROUNDING COUNTRY

of Turners Gap and Crampton Gap, entirely unlooked for and unprovided for, have now rendered the carrying out of a portion of Lee's order impossible. McLaws is in Pleasant Valley and can not return through Maryland to Boonsborough or Hagerstown. Events have rendered impossible the fulfilment of this order so far as it applies to McLaws, and Lee's army takes the direction toward the Potomac. Nothing thus far has resulted from the invasion of Maryland except a scare—for at this time it is not known that Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg are in the hands of the Confederates. The nearest point "strategy" plan is adopted, and the army marches again along the route of least resistance, toward the most practicable crossing-place on the Potomac—Shepherdstown, on which line is Sharpsburg. The morning of September 15 finds Lee with a part of Longstreet and Hill's commands—that part of the army which had been ordered to Hagerstown or Boonsborough—here behind the Antietam in its retreat to Virginia. "Under these circumstances," says Lee, "it was determined to retire to Sharpsburg, where we would be upon the flank and rear of the enemy should he move against McLaws, and where we could more readily unite with the rest of the army." About noon of this day, at Sharpsburg "official information" was received of the fall of Harpers Ferry, and "reanimated the

courage of the troops." Jackson came up early the next day. Inasmuch as Jackson had, before meeting Lee, given orders to McLaws to come with "all possible haste to Sharpsburg by way of the Virginia side of the Potomac" the reasons heretofore existing to aid McLaws in case he was attacked, by remaining here, had ceased. Lee's resolve to give battle at Sharpsburg has been referred to by very respectable authority as "audacious," because while the country in the immediate vicinity of Sharpsburg was well adapted to defense—being on high ground and behind a stream—scarcely more than two miles behind Sharpsburg is the Potomac, and if on the Virginia side of that river Lee would have had the river in his front, passable only by one ford, and at the same time much nearer to his reinforcements from Harpers Ferry; while at Sharpsburg the stream, though wide enough to oppose a natural barrier, was passable by three bridges and four fords. This is another instance of assuming that a commander can choose his battlefield. He can choose it as a penniless child, with wide-open eyes, can choose the different toys in a show window—choose but not take; he has the mental ability to choose but the moral inability to take. His thousand and one decisions, forced from him in the rush of events, commit him to the consequences of acts beyond the power of human intelligence to foresee, much less to con-

trol. When Lee gave the order of September 13 he committed himself and his army to a course of action; that order was as binding on him as on any of his generals. Strangely and consequentially, as daylight follows darkness, he was the first of all the actors under this order who could not play his part, and fulfil its conditions; and strangely also, his part necessitated no action, but simply to remain in one of two places—Hagerstown or Boonsborough—where the rest of the army should unite with him. Naturally, White, who was at Martinsburg with twenty-five hundred men, retreated to Harpers Ferry upon learning that Jackson, with a large force, was coming to attack him. Jackson took Martinsburg, and this part of the order was fulfilled. Singularly, and to the amazement of all, Miles surrendered Harpers Ferry; Jackson took possession of it, and another part of the order was accomplished, though had Lee's letter, dated September 14, in which he says to McLaws, "The day has gone against us and this army will go by Sharpsburg and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon your position to-night," reached the latter in time, he could have had no part in the capture. After the battles of Turners Gap and Cramptons Gap what course has Lee before him? If he goes in a northerly direction to cross the river at Williamsport, this fatal order to McLaws by which he obligates himself to remain

where McLaws may join him, and which pledges him to support McLaws, stands like a mountain before him; if he goes southerly to aid McLaws, he meets the 6th corps under Franklin, which, like a mountain torrent, is pouring through Cramptons Gap, while behind him are the 1st corps and Richardson's brigade of the second. The only course open to him is the resultant—to skirt this mountain stream and guard against the more threatening one in his rear; to take a position where this part of the order, "to join the main body of the army," can be fulfilled—where he can connect with McLaws, who, by another turn of fortune's wheel, is, almost at this moment, unknown to Lee, ordered by Jackson to cross the Potomac, to come up with " all possible haste to Sharpsburg by the Virginia side." Lee marches and draws his first long breath behind the Antietam. Irrevocably bound by the order of September 9, except as he might modify it by couriers when feasible, events whose insignificant beginnings had ripened into most important results beyond the power of human sagacity to foresee force him into a labyrinth of responsibilities beyond the power of human intelligence to comprehend, much less to decide. Of the choice of this place for a battle let one who was a participant in it, and who can not be accused of being a theorist (Gen. D. H. Hill) speak, and this too in a report dated ——— 1862, and

addressed to, and subject to the revision of, Lee himself: "Had our forces never been separated the battle of Sharpsburg never would have been fought, and the Yankees would not have had even the shadow of consolation for the loss of Harpers Ferry." We are not interested in conjecturing whether Sharpsburg, under other conditions, would or would not have taken place; that it did take place, and was the logical sequence of events over which no one had control, or could foresee, and that among these this order of Lee's, which, by its very definiteness, became as real a factor as a natural force in determining unlooked-for movements—not anticipated in the order of Lee's troops—is our contention; and this assertion of Hill adds very respectable opinion to its soundness.

Of the positions taken on that field of Sharpsburg to meet the on-coming Union forces, there was not a serious private in any of these organizations—cavalry, artillery, or infantry—not perfectly competent to position the organization to which he belonged for its most effective use. These men had all learned war-craft—a much more powerful and necessary acquirement than professional learning—in the only school where one ever learns anything, the school of harsh experience; they had taken part in all of the battles on the Peninsula; they had marched over every field there, had placed and sighted guns

from every opening there, knew the capacity of their guns by experience and actual testing, had gone across every field there to support batteries, regiments or in charges; had ridden around McClellan's army on the Peninsula and around Pope's at Manassas; knew how to make the easy and natural way by which they came to a field unnatural and difficult by obstructions and arms for the enemy to come over; knew how to guard against any enemy who, avoiding the way they came, should seek to come by defile, ravine, or concealed ways; knew the way by which an attack would be made, if it were made, just as well and definitely as their commander,—this latter always being a matter of conjecture; and in this instance no private's conjecture could have been wider of the mark than Lee's, for the disposition of Longstreet's corps and Hood's division—nine brigades in all—being placed south of the Boonsborough road, while Hill's five brigades were placed north of this road, indicated his expectation that attack would be made on his right; but, wonderful, of course, when he found that the indications pointed to the opposite direction, Hood's troops were sent there. The attack becoming more pronounced, more troops were asked for and more were sent. Jackson's troops, having already come up, were stationed there. When McLaws came up about sunrise of the 17th, halting his division near Lee's head-

quarters for orders, he was sent where he was most needed. When A. P. Hill's troops came in the afternoon he was not sent to the left, for the necessity there was not so pressing as on the right, where Burnside, having crossed the bridge, was threateningly advancing; Hill's troops therefore took position on the right. Barring his knowledge of the traditions and etiquette that professionalism had developed into a system to ensure its self-protection and dignity, and which are frequently confounded with the preservation of greater and more important interests, there seems to be thus far shown in the disposition of the troops no demand for a capacity above that possessed by the ordinary soldier. How this battle was carried on, what were the movements of the units, where was this regiment or that regiment, this or that battery, what they did and their positions, by orders, without orders or contrary to orders, all are matters of fact—a reproduction of which would justify Sherman's statement that "war is hell," and would even cause wonder in the minds of those who took part in this battle that such places and such acts were theirs. A corn-field, a church, woods, fences, sunken roads, protruding rocks, elevation of land, a stream in front and a river in rear, temperament of men, all of these become the conductors and non-conductors of this thunderbolt of war, whose diverging currents flow around and

through them, blasting here and leaving untouched there. Listen to some reports from commanders of regiments and batteries.

"The regiments on my left having also failed to advance, we were exposed to a fire from all sides and nearly surrounded. I sent in haste for reinforcements; with steady supports upon the right we could yet maintain our position. The support was not at hand and could not reach us in time. My men stood firm until every field officer but one had fallen, and then made the best of their way out."

"Our position was taken, I suppose, at eight a.m.; soon my attention was called to our right which was again unsupported, and almost immediately my attention was called to the opposite flank (the left) which was uncovered as far as I could see. I sent a captain to the left to see if any one was there, and he replied 'No one.' I then gave the order to fall back."

"While directing ourselves to that point, masses of Confederate troops in great confusion were seen. In this stampede, if one may so term it, the ——— troops participated."

"The regiment being formed in line on the right of the brigade, was moved forward rapidly across the open field and over a fence into the woods in front. Here a state of confusion ensued which it is difficult to portray. Various conflicting orders (mere suggestions perhaps

taking that shape) were passed down the line, the men in ranks being allowed by the officers to join in repeating them, so that it became utterly impossible to understand which emanated from the proper authority. The regiment, following the movements of the brigade, which were vacillating and unsteady, obliquing to the right and the left, came upon a ledge of rock and earth forming a firm natural breastwork. * * * At this moment Captain ———— came up, and in a very excited manner and tone cried out to me, 'They are flanking us! See! Yonder's a whole brigade.' I ordered him to keep silence and return to his place. The men before this were far from being cool, but when this act of indiscretion occurred a panic ensued, and despite the efforts of file-closers and officers they began to break and run. I ordered the few who remained—not more than ten in number—to retire. I observed, however, immediately, that all of the brigade on the left were retreating in disorder. I could see no body of men in my regiment on the way, and I went immediately down into the town in the hope of getting up with them. Here I met General Lee in the street, and reported to him the misfortune which had befallen me and asked for directions."

"Some confusion ensued from conflicting orders; coming in sight of the enemy, the firing was commenced steadily, and with good will and

from an excellent position, but, unaccountably to me, an order was given to cease firing, that General ———'s brigade was in front. This produced great confusion, and in the midst of it, a force of the enemy appearing on the right, it commenced to break and a panic ensued. The troops left the field in confusion, the field officers, company officers, and myself bringing up the rear. Instead of executing this order he moved briskly to the rear and gave the command, 'About face, march.' Major ——— of the ———, seeing this, asked him if the order was intended for the whole brigade. He replied, 'Yes,' and thereupon the ——— and the other troops on their left immediately retreated. I did not notice this retrograde movement until it was too late for me to rally them." "I was ordered to take the long-range pieces to some good position in the rear and within supporting distance of the brigade, and the two howitzers to some point immediately in rear of the brigade. Having no definite knowledge of the position for the howitzers and some confusion occurring in consequence of some horses being killed, I determined to take the whole battery to an eminence on the left where it could command my position." "By some mistake or misapprehension, the troops which were intended, I have since been informed, to support us on the left, failed to get into position as early as was expected, and our left being

unsupported, we were about to be outflanked, when the order to retire was given and obeyed, the men withdrawing in tolerable order and fighting as they fell back." "I ordered the 28th ——— to the left of the line, but the order was delivered to the 18th."

"Having occupied this important position but a few minutes, an order came from some source for me to recross the road near the place occupied by me when I received my first order in the morning to go into battle; I crossed over the road as ordered, but could find no one there to give me any information as to who gave the order or what was required." "It is a source of mortification to state that upon retiring from the engagement our colors were not brought off. I can but feel that some odium must attach to the circumstances surrounding the conduct of this regiment. The loss of our flag will always be a matter of sore and deep regret. In this connection it is but proper to state the circumstances and causes which led to its loss. When the order to retire was given, the colors began the movement to the rear, when the color-bearer, after moving but a few paces, was shot down. Upon the fall of the colors some half dozen hastened to raise them, one of whom did so and moved off, when he was shot down, which was not discovered by those surviving, while falling back; and when we had reached the

clover field (being still in the corn-field) I gave the order to halt and inquired for the colors, intending to dress upon them, and was told that the colors had gone out of the corn-field. Then I gave the order to move out of the corn and form behind the crest of a small ridge just outside of it, and in the clover-field. It was when I reached this point that I became satisfied our colors were lost. I looked in every direction for them and they were nowhere to be seen. There was no one who knew the spot where they had last fallen, and owing to the density of the corn, a view of an object could be had but a few feet."

That flag, more potent for weal or woe than any uttered command, waving, animating those to whom it belonged, giving evidence of a regiment unseen, inspiring to friends, for it says "Here is help," menacing to foes, for it says "Here is danger," fallen, lying almost within reach, and yet voiceless because unseen, the unearned trophy of any foe who may gather it up, its fall inevitable, may yet be determinative of the whole conflict, dispiriting to the soldiers who had borne it and to their commanding officer, and yet neither he nor they having power to regain it! This testimony from eye-witnesses and participants in the events described above, coupled with the statement of General D. H. Hill, "An artillery duel between the Washington Artillery and the Yankee batteries across the Antietam, on

the 16th was the most melancholy farce of the war,"—this testimony, given at least within three months after this battle, affords sufficient data on which to predicate the utter absence of any knowledge to foresee, not only great, but small happenings. "Innumerable and uncontrollable forces—for nowhere is man more uncontrollable than in battle, where the question for each is that of life or death—these uncontrollable forces which influence the progress of the battle can never be foreseen, and never governed by a single power."

It is the units that do the fighting and make the results. The regimental, cavalry, or battery organization knows its functions and its powers; its colors and its guidons are its honor. The Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac, brought face to face on the field of Antietam, are both belittled by any praise that puts the stars above the knapsack.

Chapter Two.

THE UNION SIDE

Let us now turn to the other side where "strategy" sits enthroned. The results of the immediately preceding Bull Run campaign led naturally to the reinstatement of McClellan over the combined Union forces. Events that no one could control placed him at the head of this army. "I asked the question two or three times of General Halleck, whether I was to command the troops in the field, and he said it had not been determined. And I do not think that it ever was. I think that was one of those things that grew into shape itself. When the time came I went out."

Yes, and when the time came the army went out, as everything goes out from the womb of events when the fullness of time comes. But where does it go? Where does the will of one hundred thousand soldiers—a mighty fighting machine—controlled by men whose profession is war, supplemented by the will of the North, direct this machine? Towards the enemy. It goes by the three most direct routes, because it is so large that one route is not adequate for its march; it goes by the roads that the earliest

settlers of the country had made for their convenience and benefit; goes as the electric fluid of a lightning stroke follows a stream of water or other good conductor; goes by roads whose juxtaposition, containing the center, the right and left flanks, makes a connection easy in case of need. Of the three hundred and twenty-three organizations of this army, about one hundred and twenty-one had been taken from Pope's command, and had taken part in his campaign. Its field officers were those of the former Army of the Potomac.

Let us consider that portion of McClellan's report relative to the movements of the army. "On September 3, the enemy had disappeared from the front of Washington, and the information which I received induced me to believe that he intended to cross the upper Potomac into Maryland. This materially changed the aspect of affairs and enlarged the sphere of operations; for in case of a crossing in force, an active campaign would be necessary to cover Baltimore and prevent the invasion of Pennsylvania and clear Maryland. * * * * I left Washington on September 7. At this time it was known that the mass of the Rebel army had passed up the side of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and that a portion of that army had crossed into Maryland; but whether it was their intention to cross their whole force with a view to turn to

Washington by a flank movement down the north bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or to invade Pennsylvania were questions which at that time we had no means of determining. This uncertainty as to the intentions of the enemy obliged me, up to September 13, to march cautiously, and to advance the army in such order as to continually keep Washington and Baltimore covered, and at the same time to hold the troops well in hand, so as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took the direction of Pennsylvania, or to return to the defense of Washington. . . . .

"In the meantime the process of reorganization, rendered necessary after the demoralizing effects of the disastrous campaign upon the other side of the Potomac, was rapidly progressing, the troops were regaining confidence and their former soldierly appearance and discipline were fast returning." There was no reorganization of the army in the sense of a preceding disorganization not contemplated by the least superficial reflection upon the exigencies and casualties of war, and none that the "Army Rules and Regulations" did not provide for and thoroughly cover. The morale of Hooker's division, which "was such as to warrant the most serious apprehension of their conduct in their present state," was not improved solely by change of army leader, for a part of the cause of that want of

morale—severe losses—had been sustained on the Peninsula under this same commander. The popular conception of a disorganization of the Union forces at this time was, no doubt, due to the presence in the streets of Washington of so many officers and men and wagons; but the presence of a large body of troops in the vicinity of a city always shows itself by the appearance of such in its streets; and it was especially so in this instance, when so many friends and relatives had gathered here to greet those who had survived the battles of the Peninsula and its swamps, and the campaign of northeastern Virginia.

"It would be wrong to assume that the Federal troops in the neighborhood of Washington were a mob. A defeat or series of defeats produces some disorganization and a victory produces the same, though in less degree; officers are killed, men wander away from the colors. They lose their arms, and equipments are lost; there is much confusion and the effective force of an army is sometimes seriously impaired, but with tolerable troops it is very rarely destroyed altogether, even for a short time. It very seldom happens that all troops on either side are engaged. Some are held as reserves and not brought into action; some are detached, guarding trains or roads, or posted to meet attacks which are not made; others are in order of battle, but by some one or more of the singular accidents of war, they

remain practically untouched, while death is busy around them. These bodies of troops preserve their organizations and efficiency, and may be of infinite use in forming lines under cover of which the regiments that have been roughly handled may be formed. There is in war the universal principle that there is never a vacancy. The instant a superior falls the man next him takes his place, without order and without assignment. The colonel replaces the general, the line officer the field officer, and the non-commissioned officer the commissioned officer. The man below fills the place above till orders from superior authority make a different arrangement. Thus, except in those rare cases in which an army becomes a mob, even defeat works no destruction of the framework of this great machine, and when the men are intelligent, brave and disciplined, order and efficiency are restored with great alacrity. Thus after the severe defeats which Lee inflicted upon Pope, the rear guard of infantry, artillery and cavalry was orderly and calm and formed a strong line between the Federal and the Confederate troops."

Not only so, but it may be added that the great and potent reorganizer is the colors, and especially that element in the colors that is not the representation of patriotism, of bravery or glory; that element without which there could be no army; that element which supports all existence

—food. It is only where the colors are that it can be obtained. It is this element represented in the colors that makes the tired and hungry soldier, strayed from his command, ask: "Where is the 3d, or the 6th?" It is this that quickens his footsteps more quickly than the fear of provost guard. It is this that gathers the stragglers more than harsh commands or gibes. In this the commanding officer is like the private. Each has this in common. Each can obtain this necessity in only one place, and that place is where the colors are. Neither the one nor the other, nor any or all in rank between them, can get subsistence except in this one place, any more than they, in times of peace, can live upon their neighbors.

The army then, increased by enthusiastic recruits eager and proud to unite with veteran regiments, and veterans with good-natured raillery welcoming their coming, knowing that their fringe of enthusiasm will soon be frayed by dust, heat, hunger, fatigue and danger, is in the vicinity of Washington ready to march against the enemy.

As in Lee's report of the Maryland campaign all of the possibilities of offensive, destructive and effective war measures are anticipated and explained, so in McClellan's report all of the possibilities of defense and offense, protection and effectiveness are anticipated and explained. But reports are reports, and contain what they

contain. We dismiss the phrases "cover Washington and Baltimore," "clear Maryland," "follow the enemy, if invading Pennsylvania," with the remark that no movement toward the enemy, who, when first heard of, was in the vicinity of the Monocacy, could be made without incidentally being a step toward effecting all of these things, and as many more as speculation might relate to them. We dismiss the sentence, "The army moved cautiously and advanced in such order as continually to keep Washington and Baltimore covered; and at the same time to hold the troops well in hand, so as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidly, if the enemy took the direction of Pennsylvania," with the remark that ignorance of where an enemy is, is sufficient justification for moving cautiously, and the necessary use of contiguous and parallel roads for the moving of so large a body as the Army of the Potomac could but be well adapted for concentration in case of need. The same troublesome known fact rises into prominence in this advance, that confronted Lee, and is treated with the same indifference—Harpers Ferry—and here, as resentful, it asserted its importance of a determinative fact irrespective of "plans," speculations or discussions.

The army reaches Frederick City. Here an incident occurred—the finding of Lee's "Lost Order," referred to on page 24, by a private

in the 27th Ind. Vol. Regt. Strange link in the chain of causation is this piece of paper wrapped around two cigars, accidentally found by an ex-Hoosier school-master, and destined to determine great events: strange, that between the impulse of this soldier, carried out, of lazily bending the body and reaching forth the hand to pick up this object, and the impulse, not carried out, of raising the foot to grind it with the heel into the ground, lay all the issues of this campaign. No wonder the information herein contained was not acted upon with more alacrity. Its advent into routine and formality was too precipitous. Its accidental finding discredited it. Had it been captured after a hard pursuit, from some officer or messenger, or in an attack on some officer's headquarters, such circumcumstances would have added weight to its importance. Whatever the conjectures of this soldier and the group of comrades to whom he may have read it, it remained for the garrulity of headquarters, exulting in its discovery, to so spread its contents abroad that a Southern sympathizer carried, the night of its discovery, the news of its finding to Lee at Boonsborough.

The enemy, at last, is approximately located; the signal stations, sounds of firing, and reports of scouts and countrymen verify these positions. Object lessons now begin to teach. Marks of a vanishing army are on every hand; movements

are quickened, for the spirit of the army is "to get at 'em"; apprehension is awakened; marching has now a significance it lacked before; military bearing is assumed; at headquarters the necessity of deciding increases the faculty; hit or miss, decisions must be made for the maelstrom is approaching; the current is growing quicker; under the leader whom these men had followed from Yorktown to Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, and whose name is talismanic, enthusiasm increases; through Turners Gap flows this stream; obstructed for a while it gathers new force and sweeps onward and downward to the plains below. The stream movement the most rapid bears Richardson's brigade of the 2d Corps, now under Hooker. It follows the enemy as though their footsteps had pressed down the ground for this current to flow in. But the stream suddenly stops. It has met an obstacle, which its diminishing volume and force can not remove or encircle.

Let us now return to the commanding general. On the morning of the 15th, at eight a.m., McClellan is at Bolivar, Md., three miles away from the battle-field of Turners Gap; here he learns from Hooker "that the enemy is making for Shepherdstown in a perfect panic." Before this time he has learned of Franklin's success at Cramptons Gap. At ten o'clock he is still at Bolivar; at mid-day he "is on the spot where

Reno fell"; before noon of the 15th Hooker is at the front examining the position of Lee's army, now across the Antietam. McClellan is in command of an army, one portion of which under Franklin is ten or twelve miles away in one direction, the other portion stretching away six or eight miles in another direction. The farmers of this region are questioned to obtain information as to the whereabouts of the enemy, their number, their appearance, whether going hastily or otherwise, etc., and roused from their sleep or taken from their work to guide the troops along the roads, in a country of which they are "profoundly ignorant." Imagine the definite information the commanding general must have not only of the position of the enemy, but of the position of his own troops! The commands of any commanding general under such circumstances must be an impertinence, for in asking for orders and instructions based on circumstances then existing, the time occupied in transmitting the request and its answer renders the answer inapplicable to the changed conditions when the answer is received; hence it is easy to see that while a "plan" is formulating itself, based on mirages, the unpresented and unknown facts are working out their logical consequences.

And just here unexpectedly rises Harpers Ferry as a determinative factor in these "plans"; for as Harpers Ferry and Lee's order to McLaws

relative to his movements there were determining factors in drawing Lee's army to Sharpsburg, so now Harpers Ferry, in conjunction with McClellan's order to Franklin relative to his movements in that direction, and Franklin's relations to McLaws, color and affect the speculations and consequent movements of McClellan, whenever the pressing realities of the present moment cease whirling him at their will. Crowded out of mind by the actual touch of the enemy at Turners Gap, where courier after courier rides up to force decisions, however important or unimportant, now freed from the necessity of deciding, we find him at one o'clock in the morning of the 15th, sending word to Franklin relative to his movements for the day. We can see this train of thought in his mind, admittedly delaying him and inducing a delay in the movements of Burnside, and this from his own pen: "Early in the morning (the 15th) I had directed Burnside to put his corps in motion upon the old Sharpsburg road, but to wait with me for a time until more detailed news came from Franklin."

It is not known at what time or place "detailed news" came from Franklin, but when it came, it was not of a kind to quiet apprehension of danger from McLaws; for Franklin informs him, "The enemy is in large force in my front. . . . They outnumber me two to one." Previously we

have shown how Lee's thought was centered on McLaws, now McClellan's is centered on him through Franklin. To Lee McLaws meant assistance, to McClellan he means danger. Lee's uncertainty and doubt about McLaws were removed when, on the morning of the 16th, Jackson arrived with information that he had ordered McLaws, the day before, to proceed to Sharpsburg "with all possible dispatch." But to McClellan he is yet a menace, and this menace is magnified by the representation of a major-general—Franklin. Twenty-five or thirty thousand veterans of the Peninsula, of the Valley, of Manassas, on his flank, and between them and him only Franklin's corps! They are not twenty-five or thirty thousand, and they are not there, they are not in Maryland; but to McClellan they are there and that is their number. They are there to McClellan when he gives the order to Burnside "to keep open his communications with Franklin"; they are there when he sends word to Franklin—referred to by Franklin in his letter of September 15, four p.m., "In consequence of the last orders received from you I shall await further orders here. . . I have not moved toward Sharpsburg" —for Franklin had told him at three p.m., of the 15th, "I shall start for Sharpsburg at once"; they, or some other enemy, are there to him, when he directs the signal officer in the afternoon of the 15th, the morning of the 16th, and even

as late as the afternoon of the 17th, that "our left should be observed with particular care," "to report to the battle-field any movements of the enemy visible to you at any point in the valley, or clouds of dust, or signs of forces approaching or near the position held by our army," and on the 17th, during the battle of that day "to particularly notice any approach made in the valley behind the Elk Mountains, which, bordering the Antietam, touches the Potomac near the mouth of that creek"; when on the night of the 15th, Burnside's corps was ordered into position with his left resting on the mountain where the Rohersville and Sharpsburg road crossed. Nor was the menace rendered less threatening by Halleck's dispatch to McClellan, dated September 16, 12.30 p.m., in which he says, "I fear now more than ever that they (the enemy) will recross at Harpers Ferry or below and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. This has appeared to me to be their plan, and hence my anxiety." The question of the soundness or unsoundness of Halleck's opinion is of no importance; nor is its unsoundness shown by McClellan in his comments on it in his report when he says, "We had the most positive evidence as late as the 16th, that Lee's entire army was in front of us"; for at that time neither McLaws' nor A. P. Hill's nor Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps

had arrived; and with whatever contemptuous smile McClellan may have received Halleck's "attempt to teach him the art of war," we find Sykes, on the 16th, moving "(Warren's) brigade and Randol's battery further to the left, occupying a piece of woods, and covering the approaches in the direction of Harpers Ferry," and Couch's division of Franklin's corps ordered in the night of the 16th to occupy Maryland Heights.

Another set of circumstances playing a very important factor in the "strategy" of this battle was the relations of McClellan, Burnside and Hooker with one another. It will be remembered that Burnside commanded the right wing of the army, consisting of the 1st and 9th corps; that at the battle of Turners Gap these two corps were engaged—the 1st under Hooker, the 9th under Reno, who was there killed. The strictures made by Burnside upon Hooker's report when it was forwarded to him, wherein he says: "General Hooker must remember that I had to order him four separate times to move his command into action, and that I had to myself order his leading division (Meade's) to start before he would go," in conjunction with the order of September 15, temporarily suspending Burnside from the command of the 1st corps and ordering Hooker "to report direct to these headquarters," warrant the inference that the refusal of Hooker was not a

serious offense in the eyes of headquarters, and was based on an understanding, of which the order of the 15th was an official recognition.

On the 15th is a letter from McClellan's chief of staff to Porter: "September 15, 12.30 p.m., General McClellan desires me to say that Burnside's corps has not yet marched. Should the march of Sykes' division be obstructed by Burnside's troops, direct General Sykes to push by them, and to put his division in front." (Indorsement) "Burnside's corps was not moving three hours after the hour designated for him, the day after South Mountain, and obstructed my movements; I therefore asked for this order, and moved by Burnside's corps. F. J. P." No date is given on this indorsement. Again, "On the afternoon of the 15th, I ordered Burnside to the left. He grumbled that his troops were fatigued but I started him off anyhow." On the 16th Burnside receives a severe rebuke from McClellan for delay in moving his corps.

On the other hand the *entente cordiale* between McClellan and Hooker is increasing. "On the 14th, Hooker did not move as promptly as ordered (at daylight), and this delayed Sykes and Sumner. Therefore at nine a.m.," etc., but we find no evidence of rebuke given to Hooker. Into a setting of strained relations between these three generals, consonant with an impression produced on the mind of McClellan's

antipathy against Burnside and his favor towards Hooker, fits exactly the order suspending Burnside from the command, as it not only officially severs the relations between Burnside and Hooker, but the contemporaneous movements of both are directed to a complete severance in fact, thus obviating any occasion of conflict between them. Was it suggested to Hooker, on the morning of the 15th, that an early movement on his part, even with Richardson's division of the 2d corps, then fortuitously in position, in pursuit of the enemy, would justify such an order? At eight o'clock a.m., of the 15th, McClellan writes Halleck: "I have just learned from Hooker in the advance, who states the information is perfectly reliable, that the enemy is making for Shepherdstown in a perfect panic, and General Lee last night stated publicly that he had been shockingly whipped." Two hours afterwards, "Hooker alone has one thousand more prisoners." On information from Hooker, McClellan sends word to Banks, then commanding the defenses of Washington, "I think under the present circumstances, it will be well for you to move the greater part of your command to the south side of the Potomac."

To Hooker was given the honor of leading the main attack on the 16th, whom the commanding general with his staff joined after "proceeding about half a mile, apparently to see how we were

progressing, and who informed me that I was at liberty to call for reinforcements, if I should need them, and that on their arrival they would be under my command". . . "so that when Sumner's troops came up, from a conversation I had with General McClellan the day before (the 16th), I supposed I would take command." And McClellan's letter to Hooker: "Had you not been wounded when you were I believe the result of the battle would have been the entire destruction of the Rebel army, for I *know* that with you at its head your corps would have kept on until it had gained the main road."* Enough has been said to show the relations which then existed between these three generals and their influence upon some phases, at least, of the battle.

We come now to McClellan's reports of this battle; the first report dated October 15, 1862; the second August 4, 1863. In the first he says: "The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left—at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack—with the hope of something more as soon as one or both movements were fully successful, to attack their center with any reserve I might then have on hand." In the second he says: "My plan for the impending

* The term "main road" undoubtedly refers to the road between Keedysville and Sharpsburg; if so the letter shows the most unbounded faith in Hooker's personal influence "at the head of his corps" in doing what was not done by the 1st, 2d and 12th corps.

general engagement was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by Franklin's, and as soon as matters looked favorable there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having carried their position, to press along the crest toward our right, and whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our center, with all the forces then disposable." The following facts are presented as a commentary on this "design" and this "plan."

On the 15th, "unfortunately," says Meade, "the morning opened with a heavy mist, which prevented any view being obtained, so that it was not till seven a.m. that it was ascertained the enemy had retired entirely from the mountain." Men who had gone to sleep exhausted with the march, the fighting and the excitement, and those to whom the coming of this morning presaged a battle, rose, no doubt, gladdened by the rumor now spreading through the ranks, that the enemy had fled in the night. To flee provokes pursuit. Of the two corps nearest the enemy, one had been ordered "to make a little coffee and eat their breakfast, which they had not done since the beginning of their march from the Monocacy, the morning previous." The

commander of the other gave as an excuse for not moving early "the fatigued and hungry condition of my men." Richardson's division of the 2d corps, led by the Irish brigade under Meagher, is pushed forward in pursuit. The rumor of the flight now has grown into a panic, then into a rout, then into a demoralization. "If I can believe one-tenth," writes McClellan from Bolivar at 9.30 a.m., on this day, "of what is reported, God has seldom given an army a greater victory than this." Then it is that the dispatch is sent to Banks about moving the greater part of his command to the south side of the Potomac; then to Halleck, "Information this moment received completely confirms the rout and demoralization of the Rebel army"; then to General Scott at West Point . . . "The Rebels routed and retreating in disorder this morning; R. E. Lee in command"; to Burnside: "Reliable intelligence has been received by General Hooker, and by him communicated to these headquarters, which represents a demoralized condition of the enemy, who are retreating in disorder towards the Shepherdstown Ferry."

Even as late as the evening of the 15th, one corps commander was heard to say: "To-night I shall have a good night's rest, for there is not a Rebel in Maryland." "They are demoralized." "They are making for Shepherdstown to then

cross into Virginia," is the talk. "Demoralized h——l, they'll get their second wind soon enough for you fellows," says a veteran who was at Malvern Hill, and knew the fight there was in the Army of the Potomac after the second Bull Run. "But where is this Shepherdstown Ferry?" asks some inquisitive Yankee in the ranks, who wants to know something definite in the multitude of rumors. "Oh, only ten or twelve miles from here." "Wal, if that's so what's the use of rushing? If they left here at midnight, they must have got across that stream before this time." The argument is conclusive to men who do the walking act—the charm of the day, the beauty of the landscape, the want of urgency, Hooker at the front, Sumner at the front, Fitz John Porter at the front, the commanding general, till the afternoon, at Turners Gap—so the men, left to themselves, do what men under such circumstances always do—saunter along and finally stop, not knowing what to do or where to go. This huge plant stands "stalled" like loaded street cars, when the electric flow is cut off.

Into this tableau, with its sky, mountain, valley, fields of wheat and corn, and looked upon by men into whom new life and hope have been inspired by South Mountain, who have heard the word "victory" pass along the lines—a new word for the Army of the Potomac—comes the pageantry

of the commanding general with his staff, the signal for the enthusiasm that springs forth; handsome, soldierly in his bearing, the embodiment of their spirit. "*L'Empereur est ici.*" "*L'avez vous vu?*" "*Non, mais je le sens,*" was the conversation between the two French soldiers, when Napoleon came on the field. He comes, as Hooker says, about five o'clock; and finds, McClellan says, "but two divisions, Richardson's and Sykes', in position. The other troops were halted in the road, the head of the column some distance in the rear of Richardson."

Return for a moment to Richardson. When he started out he had orders to "proceed in vigorous pursuit," with no other instructions than not to engage the enemy if he overtook them, but to "await my arrival." To Hooker were given instructions that "if the enemy were overtaken on the march, they should be attacked at once; if found in heavy force and in position, the corps in advance should be placed in position for attack, and await my arrival." These are stock phrases, whose observance always shows the formidability of the resistance presented, and the refusal of Hooker and Richardson—both energetic men—to attack, in conjunction with this quotation from Hooker's report, "Fully conscious of my weakness and morale (morale means here that the troops would not, very

sensibly, support an attack under the circumstances), I did not feel strong enough to attack him in front even after the arrival of the 1st corps," sufficiently accounts, with what has been said before, for not attacking on the 15th. But there will be an attack. The men here gathered are not professional soldiers, they want to end the war and return to their homes. They want to merit the same welcome on their return that their going received. The homes of Maryland, like the homes they left, have shown their hope and faith in them. They have been hailed as deliverers. They have tasted, for the first time, the joy of victory. There will be an attack, but it will not depend on a "design" or on a "plan"; it will depend on an opening. When the eastern basin of the Antietam is filled up with troops, there will be an outflow. It is filled up on the morning of the 16th (when all of the corps have arrived), and now the outflow begins along that eternal line of least resistance. No power on earth can change that terrible impulse that drives this force across the Antietam to meet the foe in a death grapple. How pitiable the masquerade of authority that struts about as if determining anything in this ocean of turbulence. The thinnest part of the wave is the white-cap that crests its moving. Hooker, on the morning of the 15th, saw "Lee's army ostentatiously deployed in two lines . . . with

his batteries posted to resist the passage of our forces over the bridge which crosses that stream . . . and it was only after the left of the enemy was observed to break into column and march to the rear behind a forest on which appeared the Williamsport road, that Maj. D. C. Houston, of the Engineers, was despatched up the river to find practicable fords, by means of which my troops could be thrown across the Antietam River to attack the enemy, and perhaps cut off his artillery as soon as his numbers were sufficiently reduced to justify the movement. A bridge was found, and two fords, which with little labor on the banks were rendered practicable for the passage of infantry and artillery. At five o'clock p.m., about one-half of the enemy's infantry force had passed to the rear, when I deemed it too late to make the detour in order to come up with the enemy without a night march through a country of which we were profoundly ignorant. Meanwhile the bulk of the army was arriving in the valley of Antietam, and the enemy's artillery, with a considerable portion of his infantry, remained in the position in which we had found them in the morning." He saw the confirmation of the universal opinion that Lee's army was still on the retreat. . . . What rumor, what information, what sights—and all rumors, all information, all sights are to be interpreted in accordance with the belief that Lee's army is

making for the Potomac—to change the thought of Hooker (and his thought is that of all who have seen or heard like him) between the evening of the 15th, and the time when he moves to the attack? Surely no sight during the night of the 15th, nor in the early morning of the 16th, for at seven a.m. (the 16th), McClellan sends word to Halleck, "A heavy fog has thus far prevented us doing much more than to ascertain that some of the enemy are still there."

We now examine the orders given by McClellan in his preliminary (first) report to see their appositeness to the "design" therein expressed.

"On the afternoon of the 16th, Hooker's corps . . . was sent across the Antietam Creek . . . with orders to attack, and, if possible, turn the enemy's left." "Mansfield, with his corps, was sent in the evening to support Hooker." "Franklin, who had been directed the day before to join the main army with two divisions.". . . "Burnside's corps . . . was entrusted," etc., . . . "the order having been communicated to him at ten a.m." (the 17th).

And now, for the same purpose, the second report in respect to a "plan."

"About two o'clock p.m. General Hooker . . . was ordered to cross . . . to attack, and, if possible, turn the enemy's left." "General Sumner was ordered to cross the corps of

General Mansfield (the 12th) during the night and hold his own (the 2d) corps ready to cross early the next morning." "At eight o'clock a.m. an order was sent to him (Burnside) . . . to carry the bridge. . ."

It is observed that both of the above—the "design" and the "plan"—are defective in the one essential feature of a design or plan, to wit: co-ordination.

It is irreconcilable with the idea of a plan (taking into consideration the effectiveness of a simultaneous attack) to say, "The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left, at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more by assailing the enemy's right," and to add that the main attack was ordered at two o'clock p.m. of the 16th, and the divertive movement at ten o'clock a.m. next day—twenty hours afterwards. It is irreconcilable with a plan also to say, "My plan was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and if necessary, by Franklin's, and as soon as matters look favorable there to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's right," etc., and then say that Hooker was ordered to attack about two o'clock p.m., of the 16th, Sumner to cross Mansfield's corps during the night of the 16th, Sumner to hold his corps in readiness to cross early next morning, and Burnside to move

at eight o'clock of the 17th—eighteen hours after the main attack was ordered; and even Burnside's movement, in one event, to wit, the necessity of putting in Franklin, was made contingent on Franklin's coming, whose leading division could not reach the field until ten a.m. of the 17th.

The conclusion is inevitable that both "design" and "plan" are proleptic—prepared after the events had taken place; and even then these two attempts fail to bring these movements within the semblance of a design or a plan. The incongruity appears between them and the events, because there is an attempt to mosaic events into a scheme of commandership which they do not fit. No wonder McClellan says, "I would really prefer fighting three battles to writing a report of one." The wit, or ingenuity, of man is challenged to account, in a plan, for this chasm of time between the moment when Hooker was ordered to attack, and any order, hint, or suggestion given to any other general, of a supporting or divertive movement in relation to Hooker's attack—a discrepancy in time which is made still more pronounced by reference to *McClellan's Own Story*, page 588, wherein he says: "On the morning of the 16th, I ordered Burnside to move his corps nearer the bridge, and occupy the heights in rear, as well as to watch the approach from Harper's Ferry just spoken of. I gave

this order at mid-day. . . I also instructed him to examine all the vicinity of the bridge, as he probably would be ordered to attack there next morning. . . When I returned to the right, and found that Hooker's preparations were not yet completed, I went to hurry them in person." In a letter, dated September 29, he says: "I have been hard at work all day upon a preliminary report of the recent battles, and find that in order to arrive at anything like the truth I must take all my aides to the ground and talk with them there."

The exigencies of a report necessitated the directive mind of the commanding general: *it is found in the reports*. It does not exist in events. Let us follow the example of McClellan, not confining ourselves to the talk of aides, but to the speech of contemporary evidence.

There had been no cessation in the fighting since these two armies, or portions of them, came within reach of one another; every clearing between them had been traversed by a bullet or a shell. The battle of the 14th closed with the Federal soldiers—the real opening-seekers—alert to find new ways of getting at the enemy. It is they, with the farmers of the region, and those who are only too glad to furnish information under such circumstances, who discover the enemy, his force and his position, and not the

traditionally presented general, who sits on his horse, surrounded by his staff, scanning the horizon with his field-glasses.

Stand upon a sea-coast, when the tide is coming in. Observe the contour of this coast, its indentations and projections, here a beach, there a solitary rock and again a promontory; the tide pushes far up the beach, rests at the feet of the promontory, and circles around the solitary rock. Before this onward tide, now pouring into the basin of the Antietam, is a natural barrier—a stream. Over this stream are three bridges, the lower one commanded by cannon and a hill, whose fences form another natural barrier. The middle bridge leads to the high ground, also overlooked by cannon; the upper bridge leads to undulating ground, in no way defended. Across that upper, unguarded bridge, on the night of the 15th, two regiments bivouac; across that unguarded ford, to the left of this upper bridge, a regiment is on picket duty. Is it singular that the 1st corps in bivouac nearest that bridge and ford, and of which these three regiments are a part—the corps led by that admirable conductor of its martial spirit, Hooker—should cross that bridge and ford? About as singular as that, in crossing, the artillery should use the bridge exclusively, while infantry uses both bridge and ford. Is it singular that these crossings, which have been found by the soldiers,

who have "pumped" the natives of that region of all information, and are acting upon it before allowing them to see the glories of "headquarters"—unguarded and undefended—should be used for a movement that not a private in all those ranks would not have chosen if honored with a request for his opinion? Indeed, one private, a participant in this movement, put himself on record in a diary at the time, in a sentence whose common sense is so evident that it is no wonder it never attracted the attention of historians: "And the brigade marched, making a detour of two miles to avoid the artillery fire."

Again how singular that this movement exactly corresponds with the thought of Hooker, uttered the day before, "to attack the enemy and cut off his artillery, as soon as his numbers were sufficiently reduced to justify the movement." To those who need a "plan" we offer that of Hooker as being more in accord with the movements; but to those who need no "plan," the musket and its bearer, the man nearest the foe, the antennæ of the army, feeling its way and directing its movements.

When was the order given to Hooker to attack? McClellan and Hooker set the time at about two p.m. And now we have a dispatch from Governor Curtin to Mr. Lincoln:

"Harrisburg, September 16th, eleven p.m. "Captain Palmer telegraphs me from Hagers-

town, Md., as follows: 'I rode to McClellan's headquarters at Keedysville last night at twelve o'clock, and have just returned, leaving there at noon. . . The enemy have a strong position on the west bank of the Antietam Creek opposite Sharpsburg. McClellan's army lies on east bank within shooting distance, but under excellent cover. The battle will begin this afternoon. Hooker was moving to open the ball at noon. . . General McClellan at first thought he would send a large force of Pleasonton's cavalry with artillery to this point—which is Jones' Cross-roads, on Sharpsburg pike—but finally considered not to send them so far off." What difference does it make when Hooker was ordered to attack? The spirit of the movement does not lie in an order—as often given after a movement is already initiated or made as before; and why not here? Is there any less "delusion and illusion" now than immediately previous to South Mountain?

What is the *known* on this morning of the 16th? Fortunately the answer to this question is found in the following dispatch from McClellan, dated September 16, seven a.m.: "The enemy yesterday held a position just in front of Sharpsburg. When our troops arrived in sufficient force it was too late in the day to attack. This morning a heavy fog has thus far prevented us doing more than to ascertain that *some* of the

enemy are still there. Do not know in what force." The signal officer, whose extensive view from this position commanded Sharpsburg and Shepherdstown, with very many points of the battle-field, the approaches to it, and the country in the vicinity, says: "The movement of the enemy which seemed to attract attention, and which was twice reported—once from Washington Monument and once from the station on Elk Mountain—was the apparent motion of large trains from behind the woods west of Sharpsburg, to Shepherdstown, and into Virginia." And while McClellan was "compelled to spend the morning in reconnoitering the new position taken up by the enemy," the signal officer says: "In the afternoon (16th) the enemy's line of battle seemed to have changed from in front of Sharpsburg."

Another incident of interest is that related by Hooker, occurring on his march to the attack: "As soon as I saw my command under way I rode to the headquarters of the commanding general for any further orders he might have to give me, when I was informed that I was at liberty to call for reinforcements, if I should need them, and that on their arrival they would be placed under my command. . . We had not proceeded over half a mile before the commanding general with his staff joined me, apparently to see how we were progressing. Among other

subjects of conversation, I said to the general 'that he had ordered my small corps . . . across the river to attack the whole Rebel army, and that if reinforcements were not forwarded promptly or if another attack was not made on the enemy's right, the rebels would eat me up.'" What interpretation is to be put on this incident and this language, at such a place and at such a time?

Recall that we are in the atmosphere of "delusion" and "illusion," the known a minimum, the unknown a maximum, conjectures the only guides, guesses the only data; the fog shutting off the view of the enemy's person is not so dense as that shutting off the perception of his intentions. The known—the "great victory" of the 14th, the moral certainty that "the enemy is making for the Potomac"; the letter of McClellan (September 16, seven a.m.), "Have reached thus far (Sharpsburg) and have no doubt delivered Pennsylvania and Maryland"; the signal officers' observations of "two large trains crossing the river"; the disappearance of a part of his forces on the road to Williamsport; the thought of cutting off his artillery; the "thought of sending Pleasonton's cavalry with artillery to Jones' Cross-roads"; the dispatch to Halleck that "*some* of the enemy are still there"; the unbounded faith in Hooker; the presence of the commanding general and his staff, joining Hooker, "apparently to see how we were pro-

gressing"; the conversation as to reinforcements, and "another attack on the enemy's right"—suggestion until that time unheard of by any one; the absence of any word, order, or suggestion to any other corps commander to attack or support an attack; the fact that the attack on the 17th, was *not* begun by Hooker, but by the Confederates; that Mansfield's corps, on the morning of the 17th, was subject to Hooker's orders—was in position to make an advance with Hooker, when ordered by him, but was not ordered up until affairs looked so dubious as to necessitate their presence;—all of these considerations support the conclusion that Hooker was the deluded one, and through him McClellan; that the presence of the enemy in such force at this place was a surprise to him, similar, as will be seen later, to the position of Birney's division of the 3d corps to Lee and Longstreet, at Gettysburg; that the commanding general and his staff were here to see the enemy "rolled up." And the sanguine, but practical, Hooker, now that the movement is on the way, asks, half-jocosely, the very pertinent question: "What, if the whole Rebel army is there, is to become of my small corps?" and suggests the need of reinforcements and divertive attacks. Then, and not until then, are orders given to Sumner, to Mansfield through Sumner, and to Franklin.

But the commanding general was excited about something more than an attack; and that something was a defense. We have already adverted to the solicitude at "headquarters" as to the whereabouts of McLaws, and Franklin's relation to him. Now there is another menace on his left. The "great flanker," Jackson, is there, not in reality, but to McClellan; no signal officer has observed his coming to Sharpsburg—the night has covered that. What mean this alignment and re-alignment of Burnside's corps? Alignment must be broken before there can be any movement of the aligned troops over a bridge. Alignment does not make a bridge one whit wider.

We quote the following from *McClellan's Own Story:* "I rode to the left of the line (September 16) to satisfy myself that the troops were properly posted there to secure our left flank from any attack made along the left bank of the Antietam, as well as to enable us to carry bridge No. 3. I rode along the whole front and went considerably beyond our actual and eventual left. I threw some of the regulars a little more to the left, and observed that our extreme left was not well placed to cover the position against any force approaching from Harpers Ferry, by the left bank of the Antietam; also that the ground near 'Burnside's bridge' was favorable for defense on our side. I also instructed him (Burnside) to examine all the

vicinity of the bridge, as he would probably be ordered to attack there next morning. I therefore at once ordered Burnside to move his corps nearer the bridge, and occupy the heights in rear as well as to watch the approaches from Harpers Ferry." Says Sykes: "I moved (the 16th) his brigade (Warren's) and Randol's battery further to the left; occupying a piece of woods and covering the approaches in the direction of Harpers Ferry." The night of the 16th finds the commanding general still apprehensive of some movement on his left. Couch is sent in the night of the 16th to occupy Maryland Heights—either McLaws or Jackson, perhaps, is still there to him. Hooker is away on the right, with what success? Messages arrive from Hooker for reinforcements, for the resistance there is formidable. "When night came," says Hooker, "I had as much resistance in front of me as I could well stand up under." For McClellan to give him Sumner and Mansfield is to leave his left just so much weakened; besides it is to make Sumner subject to Hooker's orders, according to Hooker's understanding, "so that when Sumner came up, from a conversation I had with General McClellan the day before, I supposed I would take command." A compromise is effected, Sumner is ordered to send Mansfield and to hold himself in readiness to march by daylight to the support of Hooker. The day-

light may bring more definite information, and in the meantime Franklin can supply the place of Sumner, where his presence will be needed in case the left or center is attacked—for where the commanding general is is always the most important position on the field. Franklin is ordered up. "What a nuisance that Hooker is, with his grasping ambition for command, and his utter inability to comprehend the real bearings of the circumstances now before me."

Exhausted, the commanding general goes to sleep. "I am well-nigh tired out by anxiety and want of sleep." In the morning of the 17th, Sumner appears at headquarters. A strange coincidence is here presented. Exactly sixteen months and sixteen days before this morning, the 17th, Sumner, at the head of this same corps and under this same commanding general, was on one side of a river, on the other side of which were the Union forces then engaged in battle. Then, as now, he had received an order to hold himself in readiness to march across a stream; alone and beyond the view of the commanding general, when he heard the firing, he had moved the head of his column to touch a bridge, there to wait the order to cross. The command was given, and his promptness in starting saved an hour, saved the bridge which the rising river was destroying, and helped to save the army to whose support he had marched.

The corps, emulous of one another, remembered this march of the 2d, under Sumner; and the 2d could well have a just pride in its record. And now again similar circumstances appear. Sumner has had the order to hold himself in readiness at daybreak; at daybreak he hears the firing across the Antietam; he starts for headquarters, that not a moment may be lost; perhaps, as he leaves his camp, he hears some veteran of the Peninsula say: "It is the Chickahominy over again, and by G—d they need us." He reaches headquarters, and walking up and down before Pry's house, he restlessly waits for more than two hours to get orders to move, hearing all the time this firing. It is allowable to imagine that some of his reflections are not very complimentary to the person for whom he is waiting. He recalls that Richardson's division of his command led the pursuit of the enemy from Turners Gap, because they were ready; and they are now here in readiness and anxious to go to the assistance of the corps across that stream; he recalls that the morale of the corps—that which the soldier shows to the commander and without which the commander is nerveless—is good; and he does not dare go back and face that corps, now that the battle is on, without the order to march.

But why discuss the question of time when Mansfield's corps came to the support of Hooker, when Sumner's corps came to the sup-

port of both, or when Burnside was ordered to attack? Unquestionably McClellan thought that he was moving this mass of troops to do his bidding, when in reality the mass was moving him. He says: "Those on whose judgment I rely tell me that I fought the battle splendidly, and that it was a masterpiece of art." Any other result would have shown no more intelligence in commander; no greater daring, bravery or endurance in those who struggled and those who died.

A simultaneous attack, even if it had been ordered, with such a number of men, was, and is, a moral impossibility.

Go to some railroad station when a large number of people is expected, to meet a friend, coming even from a short distance, and be told when the friend finally arrives, that he has been waiting on the train within one or two miles of the station for more than five hours. The experience of years in times of peace; the intelligence of men who are trained in the railroad business; the manner of conveyance adjustable to the quickest movement; the knowledge of every foot of roadbed in every one of the employees—from section hand through all grades up to the station-master—by the nature of the employment; the personal equation reduced to a minimum; every one basing his action on facts and not on guesses; no movements interrupted

except by the accidents of peace; these trained, serious, sober men have not been able to meet such emergencies, though anticipated for weeks and months, without disarrangements and disturbances of time schedules, and great delays. There is no design or want of design that produces this confusion. In battle, or approaching battle, the personal equation is at a maximum, for the question is one of life or death.

The field of this battle was unknown; probably its name had never been heard of, five days before the 17th, by either commander or any soldier save some Marylander in the ranks. McClellan says: "All I knew of it was what I could see from a distance." "I rode all over the battle-field again yesterday (September 30th), so as to be sure that I understood it all before writing my report."

Unknown its roads, the relations of its forests, its depressions, its fences, its buildings, its ploughed fields and corn-fields, its orchards, its rocks, its sunken roads, its foes in forests, behind rocks and ledges, its buildings and elevations; and this ignorance does not disturb the complacency of military science!

Return now to the movements on the right. The well-known custom of rotation of commands on an advance is explanatory of the positions occupied by the divisions, brigades and regiments; the coming on of night fixed these



MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS AS GIVEN ON GOVERNMENT MAP

positions. The position of the enemy on the morning of the 17th determined the deployment of these regiments. The first shot fired, whether accidentally or intentionally, was the beginning of that series of events which led to the disintegration of this mass, and their re-forming conformably to the contour of the ground. The on-coming current is now under way. Read Hooker's report: "At daylight we were fully prepared to renew our march, which lay through orchards, corn-fields, and over ploughed ground, skirted on either side by forests, the cleared space between which averaged not more than four hundred or five hundred yards in width, the field and the objects in view narrowing my front to quite a limited degree . . . . my object was to gain the high ground, nearly three-quarters of a mile in advance of me, and which commanded the position taken by the enemy on his retreat from South Mountain; to prevent which he had been reinforced by Jackson's corps during the night, and at the same time had planted batteries on high ground on our right and rear, to enfilade our lines when exposed during the advance." It can easily be conceived that with batteries in the rear the movements of Hooker's troops would be visibly accelerated! Now consult the governmental maps on which the positions of the troops are so intelligently placed by General Carmen, and observe the

position of Hooker's corps—the front of this oncoming wave—its force and movement conformable to the obstructions of fences, orchards, ledges, roads, houses, batteries and infantry. It sweeps on in the current of battle; finally met by a stronger current, it is whirled into the eddy and borne backwards farther than where it began its forward movement. See Mansfield's corps advancing diagonally in the direction of Hooker, and meeting it about the moment of its farthest advance, continuing on a little farther in the direction of its impulse, then swept back to the position of its starting. See Sumner's corps starting from a position about a mile from the point of Hooker's arrest and facing west; one division whirled back to the starting point of Hooker; another to a position on the right of Mansfield; another division southwest from its starting.

Of the movements of regiments in this battle the following is an example: "I was ordered by Colonel I——, commanding the 3d brigade, to send a company to dislodge some of the enemy, who were annoying one of our batteries. Hardly was the company detached from the regiment when Colonel I—— rode along and exclaimed in nearly these words, 'That is not enough, sir; go yourself, take your regiment and drive them from those trees and buildings.' I asked him to repeat his order and point out the ground again. He did so quite emphatically, in nearly

the same words and added with an oath, 'Those are your orders, sir.' He repeated the order several times. I took the regiment in front of the skirmishers of the brigade next on our left, formed them behind a fence, sent out my skirmishers, who drove the Rebel skirmishers in fine style from the edge of the corn-field and the hollow lying on this side of the timber I was ordered to clear. I ordered the battalion forward, and as they opened fire on us from front and left flank I ordered a charge with fixed bayonets, and the men dashed forward in line with a cheer, advancing nearly a quarter of a mile at the double-quick. The body of the enemy in the orchard to our left being flanked, broke and ran. Those directly in front, behind haystacks and outbuildings, also broke, and their colors having fallen, we dashed on up the hill to secure them, when a Rebel regiment rose suddenly on our right, poured in a volley, and at the same time I saw them double-quicking around to the left, to cut off our retreat. Those in front, seeing our small numbers, had rallied. Looking back and seeing no support, to escape being surrounded I marched the regiment by the left flank, formed them on a crest in the orchard, poured a volley into those who were advancing to cut off our retreat, and faced those in front. Here we received a severe fire from three directions, and the enemy advanced in force.

I saw four battle-flags. A battery opened on us with grape. Here we met a heavy loss, but were shielded some by the trees of the orchard. Having disposed of most of our cartridges, we retreated through the orchard, gave them another volley as they attempted to follow, which drove them back, and closing up on colors, I marched the regiment back in good order to its old position on the left of the 3d brigade. The affair lasted about thirty minutes. Fifteen officers and one hundred and sixty-six men went into the fight. Twelve enlisted men were killed, sixty wounded and brought off, sixteen fate still unknown." Read now the report of the officer who gave these orders relative to this movement: "Finding the regiment so severely engaged, I was very anxious to support them, but my orders were positive *not to advance* my line. I rode rapidly forward and requested the officer commanding the right regiment of the 2d brigade to support Major H——, which he declined to do without orders from General B—— (his brigade commander). I then returned to my own line to ask for a support from the rear but in a few minutes I had the extreme pleasure of seeing the shattered but brave remnant of the 7th return in good order to my lines." And now the report of the commander over this officer, relative to this same affair: "I refer to the conduct of that regiment acting under

orders from Colonel I—— . These orders were not made known to me till after the regiment had moved." A perusal of the reports of commanders of regiments and batteries given by those who were eyewitnesses of what they were describing shows scenes and experiences of confusion of movements under orders, without orders, contrary to orders, and orders inappropriate, useless and harmful, similar to those that characterize the Confederate reports.

It is frequently said, that "The history of a State or a nation is the history of a few leading men," and no one cares to take the trouble to contradict the saying, for the multitude have neither the time nor the patience to study the forces that work beneath the surface of things. But the people of the United States would smile at such a statement if applied to any one or any few contemporary men as determining in any way their industries, their finances, their arts, their sciences, their education, their traditions, their prejudices—the only generative seeds of the centuries to come. So might the men engaged in this battle, who carried the guns, who did the fighting, who placed the missiles in cannon and fired them, who opposed their bodies to the oncoming foe, and without whom there would have been no contest, smile at the military history of that day in which about one-tenth of one per cent of one hundred thousand men engaged is

mentioned, and these only as giving orders wrenched from them by unmanageable and uncontrollable circumstances. The military history of that day, September 17, 1862, at Antietam, is a distorted fragment of that day's events. The eyes of soldiers horrified by scenes of carnage; of mangled forms of men and horses; of slaughter-house experiences; of ranks of strong young men, comrades, swept away by the reaper, Death; ears shocked with groans, delirium and curses; bodies exhausted by moving through woods and corn-fields, marching over ploughed ground and uneven places, climbing fences, carrying heavy muskets, rounds of cartridges, canteens, clothing; mouths salted and dried by tasting powder; chins blackened by biting cartridges, whose saliva helped to dampen and foul their muskets; arms tired with pushing ramrods into hot, foul and smoking guns, or lifting shrapnel, solid shot, shell, grape and canister, or tugging and lifting artillery into different positions, pushing forward pieces after their recoil, swabbing and ramming cannon; without food or water under the dazzling sun of September; failure of support, more moral than physical in its influence; and still before them a sullen, desperate foe,—do not all these things combined sufficiently account for the cessation of that terrible conflict?

The sight-seer visits that field of battle to-day.

He sees monuments marking the positions of regiments, and on their inscriptions he reads the story of that terrible conflict, in the number of the killed and the wounded; he visits some city, and in a prominent position—where it can be observed by all—he sees the statue of some commander on that same field of battle, and he says, "It is well; each is fittingly placed."

To those who believe in the idea, invented for the benefit and pleasure of heroes, that a general's will determines when, where and how the army under him shall fight a battle—one of the most important events of a nation's history—an easy answer is found to the question, "Why did not McClellan renew the contest on the morning of the 18th?" But to those who believe "that the progress of events is inevitable; that it is the result of the combined volition of all who participate in the events, and that the influence of generals is superficial and fictitious; that the mass sentiment has its ebbs and flows, its exaltations and depressions, as the sentiment of the units which compose it; that this sentiment is communicated to and directs the will of the general as the feelings of the body direct the will of the individual—these seek and find in the mass an answer entirely different and entirely consonant with the facts of history. The facts of this battle, discovered a long time after it had occurred, are grouped together by plan-makers,

and with perspectives of recitals of "intentions"—"what I ordered," "what I concluded"—of advantageous opportunities seen by those to whom, for an instant, the fleeting panorama of events was revealed, are presented as facts that could be foreseen, and which would have worked out the most happy results, had not the imbecility or malice of some subordinate thwarted these "plans." Is it not enough to know that "the troops were greatly overcome by the long continued and severely contested battle of the 17th," and the want of spirit and of initiative which accompany fatigue and exhaustion, to account for any inaction? There was no external impulse to push forward this mass. The atmosphere of delusion and illusion was the same on the morning of the 18th as on the morning of the 17th, but weariness now can not interpret it into even the shadow of that success of which the faith and hope of the yesterday gave the substance. Relegate the commanding general to the orbit in which he revolves, and leave it to military astrologers to make a horoscope of his planetary influence on real events.

When the battle of Antietam was over it was heralded to the North that a great victory had been won, and there was rejoicing; but when the historical presentation of it showed the incompleteness of the success there was disappointment; and contrary to all human experience,

which always attributes a failure of the farmer's crops to the unkindness of nature, here the failure of complete success was attributed to the incompetency of the commanding general, and he was removed from the head of the Army of the Potomac.

Chapter Three.

THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.

The wave has receded, to be followed by the advancing Northern wave, which, at first absorbed in the soil of Virginia (The Mud Campaign), then gathers strength and dashes itself against the heights of Fredericksburg, recoils and sweeps on to Chancellorsville, then back again across the Rappahannock. Between this river and Richmond, and opposite the Union army, lie the encampments of the Confederate army. And now another movement is made like that of the year before, and with the same motive power—hunger, acting on the mass with the force of a migratory instinct. The "plan" of this movement, with a change of names, is almost identical with that of the year before, as it might naturally be with the same object in view; the "strategy" of the movement is that of an army bent on obtaining food and supplies in a hostile country, and fighting for them if necessary. As in the first movement no obstacle in the way of an opposing army (the Army of the Potomac having retreated toward Washington) was in its path, its movements were direct and by the shortest route; so in this,

an opposing army was an obstacle, and an indirect and circuitous route was taken to avoid this obstacle; then, the Potomac was crossed "east of the Blue Ridge"; now, it was crossed west of that mountain chain; then, in the "plan" "it was necessary to dislodge the enemy from Harpers Ferry"; now, though Harpers Ferry with its ten thousand men would threaten "our communications with the Potomac through Hagerstown and Williamsport," no attention was given to it.

Now, one object of the movement was to draw the enemy from the position he occupied opposite Fredericksburg, "this being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage." "The execution of this purpose embraced the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac. It was thought that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy, to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army then commanded by General Hooker"; but a little later we are informed: "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy."

The army begins its march; two corps, Longstreet's and Ewell's, reached Culpeper on June 8, Hill's corps yet in position along the Rappahannock. On the night of June 15, Early and Johnson of Ewell's corps, were at Win-

chester; Rodes' division, of the same corps, twenty-five miles farther northeast at Martinsburg, Hill's corps not yet having reached Culpeper. Longstreet's corps left Culpeper on June 15. The distance between the advance and rear of this army on this day is about one hundred miles.

On June 19 Hill's corps was between Sperryville and Front Royal; Longstreet's corps between Ashbys Gap and Snickers Gap; Ewell's corps stretched out between Shepherdstown and Hagerstown. The distance between the front and rear of Lee's army on this day was nearly eighty miles, Hill and Longstreet covering an extent of about forty miles, and Ewell's rear removed from Longstreet's advance by a distance of about twenty-five miles. On June 25 and 26, Longstreet's corps crossed the Potomac; Ewell was now at Chambersburg, and Hill between Ewell and Longstreet, the distance now covered by the army being about forty miles, and on this day (the 25th) Stuart's cavalry was at Gum Springs on its way around the Union army.

On the morning of the 26th two divisions of Ewell's corps, Rodes' and Johnson's, leave Chambersburg for Carlisle, reaching there on the 27th; at the same time Early's division of the same corps leaves Greenwood (eight miles east from Chambersburg) with "instructions to cross

the South Mountain to Gettysburg, and then proceed to York, and cut the Northern Central Railroad, running from Baltimore to Harrisburg, and also destroy the bridge across the Susquehanna and rejoin him (Ewell) at Carlisle by the way of Dillsburg." These instructions Early proceeds to carry out by *not* going to Gettysburg, but by taking the more direct route to York by the way of Mummasburg, sending one brigade and a battalion of cavalry to Gettysburg. In his report Early says: "I had heard that there was probably a force at Gettysburg, though I could get no definite information as to its size, and the object of this movement was for Gordon to amuse and skirmish with the enemy while I should get on his flank and rear, so as to capture his whole force." When he reaches Mummasburg he learns "that the force at Gettysburg is small," and while waiting for his infantry to come up, he sends a force of cavalry to pursue this militia force, and "Hay's brigade on arriving was also dispatched towards Gettysburg." This militia force which had been encountered in the vicinity of Gettysburg—at Marsh Creek—was the 26th Pennsylvania Regiment, of about eight hundred or nine hundred young men, who had enlisted as emergency men to guard the frontier of Pennsylvania; of this force one hundred and seventy-five prisoners in all were captured and subsequently paroled. "The day was rainy,"

says Early, "and as it was late when I reached the place (Gettysburg) and having to move upon York early the next day," etc.; he then proceeds to York and to Columbia. "On the evening of the 29th I received through Captain ———, aide of General Ewell, a copy of a note from General Lee, and also verbal instructions, which required me to move back, so as to rejoin the rest of the corps on the western side of the South Mountain." Lee says: "The movement against Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received from a scout on the night of the 28th to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was approaching the South Mountain. In the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to ascertain his intentions, but to deter him from advancing farther west, and intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains"; and Longstreet says in his report: "On the night of the 28th one of my scouts came in with information that the enemy had passed the Potomac, and was probably in pursuit of us." "The scout was sent to general headquarters with the suggestion that our army concentrate east of the mountains, and bear down on the enemy." It is left to the reader's consideration to determine upon the presentation of what follows when any "intention" of concentrating east of the mountains was shown.

When Gordon's brigade of Early's division met the 26th Pennsylvania Regiment at Marsh Creek, as we have already seen, it was the beginning of a series of events which colored and determined all the issues of this campaign in a military sense. This regiment was as unconscious of the resultant consequences of its action as was Lee or any one else. It was one of those insignificant events that so often are the important factors in great results. The colonel of this regiment had, so far as known, never been heralded as a "fighting colonel"; very probably he had never been addressed in that capacity as a "Mr." The boys composing that regiment had probably the same feelings as thousands of other boys in both armies. When first facing a veteran force they fled, and many of them were captured, but their guns spoke just as loudly as those of veteran regiments, a few days after on this same field. Early heard them at Mummasburg, ten miles away; Lee heard them at Chambersburg, twenty-five miles away. When Early heard them he rode to Gettysburg and ordered Hay's brigade there and stopped the march of his division to York; but when he arrived there was nothing disquieting; his perspective was simply the scenery of a quiet village in Pennsylvania. But Lee's perspective was not Early's. On June 25, the day before this affair, Lee had written a letter to Davis, in

which he said: "In addition to the one hundred thousand troops called forth by President Lincoln to defend the frontier of Pennsylvania you will see that he is concentrating other organized forces in Maryland." Lee's perspective of this affair was one hundred thousand men, of which this force was a part. Is it permissible to assume that Governor Curtin's proclamation for sixty thousand more men, issued on June 26, was known to him by the time he received information of the affair at Gettysburg? Whether or not the information concerning the delay of Early and the Gettysburg affair was sent to him direct from here or by Ewell, Early's corps commander, taking the day of the 27th for its transmission, we find him on the night of the 27th sending word to Ewell to move his forces back to Chambersburg. During the night of the 27th the reports of those muskets are echoing around his headquarters, and when morning comes, at half-past seven, the following letter is sent to Ewell.

"Chambersburg, June 28, 1863, 7.30 a.m.
"Lieut. General R. S. Ewell,
"Commanding General.

"*General:* I wrote you last night, stating that General Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac, and to be advancing by way of Middletown, the head of his column being at a point in Frederick County. (On the night of the

26th, the 11th corps, under Howard, leading the advance of the Army of the Potomac, had headquarters at Middletown.) I directed you in that letter to move your forces to this point. (To what point? Gettysburg? No, Chambersburg.) If you have not already progressed on the road (Why should he have progressed on the road unless previously ordered?) I desire you to move in the direction of Gettysburg via Heidlersburg, where you will have turnpike most of the way, and can join your other divisions to Early's, which is east of the mountains. I think it preferable to keep on the east side of the mountains. When you come to Heidlersburg you can either move directly on Gettysburg or turn down to Cashtown. Your trains and heavy artillery you can send, if you think proper, on the road to Chambersburg. But if the roads which you take are good they had better follow you.

"R. E. LEE, *General.*"

Suggestions as to what roads "trains and heavy artillery" shall take are more significant of intentions than the more mobile movements of troops. Gettysburg, Heidlersburg, Cashtown are here mentioned incidentally. Chambersburg is the point designated—the objective point. On the morning of the 29th, Ewell, about to start from Carlisle toward Harrisburg, received an order from the commanding general

to return to Cashtown; but on the evening of that day at York, thirty miles away, Early received, through an aide of Ewell, a copy of a note from General Lee and also verbal instructions, "which required me to move back, so as to rejoin the rest of the corps on the western side of the South Mountains; and accordingly, at daylight on the morning of the 30th, I put my whole command in motion, moving by Weiglestown and East Berlin in the direction of Heidlersburg, from which I could move either to Shippensburg or Greenwood—both of which places are west of the mountains—by the way of Arendtville, as circumstances might require." Is there any doubt that the letter from Lee, of which Early received a copy on the night of the 29th, was other than one of the two letters hereinbefore referred to? Not only that, but when Stuart arrived at Dover, on the morning of July 1, he says: "The most I could learn was that General Early had marched his division in the direction of Shippensburg, which the best information I could get seemed to indicate as the point of concentration of our troops."

It will be seen on examining the letter from Lee to Ewell, just cited, that the suggestion of the commanding general as to sending "trains and heavy artillery," on the road to Chambersburg, was carried out, for in Johnson's report, he says: "On June 29, in obedience to orders, I counter-



GETTYSBURG AND ITS CONNECTIONS

marched my division to Greenville, thence eastwardly via Scotland"; and in Ewell's report: "On the night of June 30, Johnson, with Colonel Brown's reserve artillery, was between Green Village and Scotland." Johnson's division reached Shippensburg on the night of the 29th.

From Shippensburg to Arendtville—east of the mountains—and about four or five miles from Cashtown, was an entirely free and direct road, the one by which Early "could move to Shippensburg." Instead of being ordered to take this road, Johnson comes to Scotland via Greenville, and reaching the Chambersburg pike on the morning of July 1, delays the march of Longstreet's corps by his "long wagon trains." It is submitted, then, that there was no intention of concentrating east of the mountains up to the time when Johnson left Shippensburg, to wit June 30, at about ten o'clock a.m.

On June 29, two divisions of Longstreet's corps were ordered to move to and encamp at Greenwood. They moved the next morning (30) and reached Greenwood (eight miles from Chambersburg) at two o'clock in the afternoon. The urgency of "concentration east of the mountains" is not apparent in the slowness of the above movement. The other division (Pickett's) had been left to guard the rear at Chambersburg. On July 1, Lee ordered Imboden to relieve

Pickett, "who will then move forward to this place—Greenwood—and to-morrow (July 2) I advise you to move up to this place—Greenwood—establish yourself so as to command the cross-roads leading into town, throw out pickets on the roads to Shippensburg, New Guilford, Chambersburg and Greencastle, and establish a separate picket at Greencastle. You will at the same time have an opportunity of reorganizing your troops, refreshing them for a day or two, etc." At nine p.m., on the 30th, two S. C. regiments were ordered on picket duty at New Guilford, one of which regiments had spent the day of the 29th in tearing up and burning the railroad track north and south of Chambersburg, and these regiments on duty at New Guilford were relieved by Law's brigade on the morning of July 1. On the morning of the 27th Anderson's division of Hill's corps marched from Chambersburg to Fayetteville, at which place it halted until July 1.

Let us now return to the movements of Lee's army that had led up to these positions which they now occupy. To Ewell it had been suggested that he advance toward the Susquehanna, "taking the routes by Emmittsburg, Chambersburg and McConnellsburg." To Stuart, on the same day, June 22, Lee wrote: "One column of General Ewell's army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmittsburg

route, another by Chambersburg"; to Imboden, on the 23d, "Ewell in advancing toward the Susquehanna will probably have one column on the McConnellsburg road"; and again to Stuart, June 23, "The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former letter." No portion of Ewell's corps went either by the way of Emmittsburg or McConnellsburg. Were his progress and direction determined by the developments of circumstances? And were a part of these circumstances the facts that on June 16 the call of Governor Curtin for fifty thousand men to resist this invasion was published in the newspapers of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, and on the 17th a like call was made by Governor Bradford of Maryland? facts, which it is presumed came to the knowledge of Lee, as he mentions to Davis, in his letter of the 25th, the call of President Lincoln for one hundred thousand men, of which these sixty thousand are the quota of these two States. Certain it is that the way of Emmittsburg was the shortest for Early to take in reaching any place approached by him east of the mountains, and in the utter absence of any reference to this change of "plan" "which had been matured after so much thought," as Longstreet puts it in his book, one is forced to this conclusion. The scout story does not account for movements which had taken place before he appeared on

the scene, and the record of this scout's inference in Longstreet's report is amusing. Not a movement made during almost a whole month, except for the purpose of obtaining food and supplies, and to avoid the Army of the Potomac, and now at the eleventh hour the revelation is accorded in the shape of a scout's surmise, that the enemy "was probably in pursuit of us."

On June 19 Lee had written to Davis, "Indications seem to be that his (the enemy's) main body is proceeding toward the Potomac." On the 20th, "The movements of the main body of the enemy are still toward the Potomac." Again on the 23d, "Reports of movements of the enemy east of the Blue Ridge cause me to believe that he is preparing to cross the Potomac." Again on the 25th, to Davis, "I have not sufficient troops to maintain my communications, and therefore have to abandon them. I think I can throw General Hooker's army across the Potomac." Again, on the same day, to Davis, "Our true policy is, as far as we can, to so employ our own forces as to give occupation to his at points of our selection"; and again on the 25th to Davis, "It should never be forgotten that our concentration at any one point compels that of the enemy." Was this army like an ostrich that fancies because its head is concealed there is no exposure of its body?

Let us now turn to the relation of the Con-

federate cavalry to this movement. When the Army of Northern Virginia began this movement, dividing it into the commands which acted separately, we find Stuart with three brigades, Robertson with two brigades, Jenkins with one brigade and Imboden with two regiments. Stuart was ordered to a movement that swept him around the Union army. Robertson was ordered "to place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harpers Ferry, cross the Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear." Jenkins accompanied Ewell's corps, and Imboden on the line from Martinsburg to Cumberland. On June 30 the positions of these different bodies of cavalry were as follows: Stuart on the road from Westminster to Hanover; Jenkins with Ewell; Robertson and Jones' forces, one regiment in the vicinity of Harpers Ferry, the others on the road by the way of Williamsport and Chambersburg to Cashtown, which they reached on July 3—the last day of the battle; Imboden was near Mercersburg. "In the absence of the cavalry," says Lee, "it was impossible to ascertain his intentions (Meade's), but to deter him from advancing further west and intercepting our communications (which had been abandoned) with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains."

Every one of these bodies of cavalry was in

the position—modified by circumstances over which the commands had no control—that had been assigned to it by Lee's orders or sanction. Nor could it make any difference to a general at Chambersburg, as to "intercepting our communications," whether the Army of the Potomac approached east or west of the mountains, for in either event that army must necessarily be between him and the Potomac, if advancing northward.

Up to this time, June 30, the movements of this army had been successful in a military (?) sense. At Winchester "the fruits of the victory —three hundred loaded wagons, and quite a large amount of commissary and quartermaster's stores." At Martinsburg "The enemy destroyed many of the stores, but six thousand bushels of grain and a few quartermaster's and commissary stores fell into our hands." To Ewell, on June 19, were given instructions "to keep yourself supplied with provisions and send back any surplus." To Imboden, June 20, writes Lee, "I am also gratified at the cattle and horses that you have already captured for the use of the army, and hope that your expectations of obtaining similar supplies will be realized. They are not only important but essential, and I request that you will do all in your power to obtain all you can." To Stuart, on June 22, "Collect all the supplies you can

for the use of the army." To Ewell, on the 22d, "Every exertion should, therefore, be made to locate and secure them (supplies)." Again to Ewell, on the 23d, "I also directed Stuart to keep you advised of the movements of the enemy, and assist in collecting supplies for the army. I also directed Imboden, if opportunity offered, to cross the Potomac and perform the same offices on your left." To Imboden, June 23, "I now repeat and add my thanks for the cattle and sheep you have sent to the valley. I want you to continue your operations, and make every exertion to collect all the supplies you can." To Imboden, July 1, "Obtain all the flour that you can load in your wagons from the mills in your vicinity, and if you can not get sufficient, I believe there are seven or eight hundred barrels at Shippensburg, about ten miles north of Chambersburg, on the Carlisle road."

In his report Stuart says: "Our wagon trains were now a subject of serious embarrassment. I had this immense train (captured) in an enemy's country." Early says: "I then made a requisition upon the authorities (York) for two thousand pairs of shoes, one thousand hats, one thousand pairs of socks, $100,000 in money, and three days' rations of all kinds. Subsequently between twelve and fifteen hundred pairs of shoes, the hats, socks and rations, were furnished, but only $28,000 in money was

furnished." Says Rodes: "Large supplies of cattle, horses and flour were obtained here and on the march." Says Ewell: "At Carlisle, General George H. Stuart, who had been detached to McConnellsburg from Greencastle, rejoined the corps, bringing some horses and cattle. At Carlisle, Chambersburg, and Shippensburg requisitions were made for supplies, and the shops were searched, many valuable stores being secured. At Chambersburg, a train was loaded with ordnance and medical stores and sent back. Nearly three thousand head of cattle were collected and sent back by my corps, and my chief commissary of subsistence, Major (W. J.) Hawks, notified Colonel (R. G.) Cole (Lee's chief commissary of subsistence) of the location of five thousand barrels of flour along the route traveled by the command."

The immediately above quotations—and they can be increased—from letters and reports do not show a heroic side of this movement. They serve, however, to accentuate the well-known saying, that "An army moves on its belly." To the Northern soldier, whose food was provided for him from the plenteousness of supplies, simply by requisitions on depots, this phase of mass hunger was unknown. To the Southern soldier it was the constant thought of the morrow's food that determined the morrow's

movements; hence the suggestion not only "to collect supplies but to locate them." This brings us to the consideration of a report which explicitly contradicts the intention of concentration "east of the mountains," and is a further exemplification of the object of this whole movement, even on the threshold of the battle—*food.* The report is that of General A. P. Hill: "On the morning of June 29, the 3d corps, composed of the divisions of Major-Generals Anderson, Heth and Pender, and five battalions of artillery, under command of Colonel R. L. Walker, was encamped on the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, near the village of Fayetteville. I was directed to move on this road in the direction of York, and to cross the Susquehanna, menacing the communications of Harrisburg with Philadelphia, and to co-operate with General Ewell, acting as circumstances might require. Accordingly, on the 29th, I moved General Heth's division to Cashtown—following on the morning of the 30th with the division of General Pender, and directing General Anderson to move in the same direction." Not only had Hill then received orders, but was carrying them out, and not only was he carrying them out, but his intentions to do so had become known; for on June 30, Buford in a letter to Pleasonton, of that date, says: "On pushing him (the enemy) back to Cash-

town, I learned from reliable men that (R. H.) Anderson's division (of Hill's Corps) was marching from Chambersburg by Mummasburg, Hunterstown, Abbottstown, on toward York." Preliminary to a further consideration of the above quotation from Hill's report, it may be said that in the universal proclivity of seeking some individual or individuals, whose action or want of action is always taken as causative of all results, Hill had been "blamed" for having brought on this engagement at Gettysburg. Very naturally, it is assumed, his official report might contain a justification of his action, and a correction, so far as possible, of that popular opinion. Longstreet says: "It seems that General Hill misconstrued the orders of the day, or was under the impression that he was ordered to march to York." Inasmuch as Hill's report bears date of November, 1863, when the events leading up to this battle were fresh in his memory, and as his report was subject to Lee's revision, the contrary of Longstreet's hypothesis seems more reasonable. Observe that the first letter to Ewell, ordering his recall to Chambersburg, was dated at this place on the night of June 27, presumably upon Lee's hearing of the events of the 26th, at Gettysburg; that Early reached York on the evening of the 27th; that instruction had been given that "every exertion should be made to locate and secure food"; "that my

(Ewell's) chief commissary of subsistence notified Cole (Lee's chief commissary) of the location of five thousand barrels of flour along the route traveled by the command"; that according to the eighth census (1860) York County was the ninth flour-producing county of Pennsylvania, the yield in that year being valued at $1,055,496; that "when he (Early) reached York there were nearly twelve hundred barrels of flour at Louck's mills, one and a half miles northeast of York, operated by P. A. and S. Small, and nearly two thousand barrels of flour at the Codorus mills, owned by the same firm, one mile farther down the Codorus. The bins of these mills contained about ten thousand bushels of wheat which had been recently purchased from farmers. The Haldeman Mill, below New Cumberland, had about four hundred barrels of flour. In each of the smaller mills throughout York County there were from ten to one hundred barrels of flour. There is no doubt that there were six thousand barrels of flour within the limits of York County on June 28, when General Early entered the town. The excitement of the times made it impossible for the owners of this flour to ship it beyond the Susquehanna"; the exigencies of a report may have demanded a suppression of some facts; all of these considerations furnish an adequate motive for the movement of Hill, conformable with the motive that brought this

army into Pennsylvania; similar in "strategy" to the division of Lee's army in the Antietam campaign, and for the same purpose; similar in "strategy" to the unsupported positions of the different corps on their route into this region.

All of the indications point to Greenwood as the place of concentration of the army until the moment when rifles assumed control. It was here that Imboden was ordered, with his cavalry, as late as July 1, to organize his troops, "refreshing them for a day or two"; from here he was "to throw out pickets on the roads to Shippensburg, New Guilford, Chambersburg, and Greencastle, and establish a separate picket at Greencastle"; it was here that Longstreet, in his haste to "concentrate east of the mountains, and bear down to meet the enemy," arrived in the afternoon of the 30th, at two o'clock, having received orders at Chambersburg, eight miles away, on the morning of the 29th; it was from here that Longstreet, at nine o'clock on the night of the 30th, sent two regiments on picket duty at New Guilford, relieving them the next morning (July 1), by Law's brigade; it was here that Pickett's division was ordered on July 1; it was here that Hill's corps was encamped till he began his movements toward York; it was here, or at Shippensburg, that Early, on the night of the 29th, received through an aide of General Ewell a copy of a note from General Lee and also verbal

instructions to rejoin the rest of the corps; it was "at or near Cashtown"—which was here—that Rodes had orders to join the balance of the army. He says, "When within four miles of Gettysburg, on July 1, to my surprise, the presence of the enemy there in force was announced."

Harpers Ferry again rises into prominence, contributing by its definiteness as a fact a deterrent principle which holds Lee within the limits of its influence. When Stuart started on his ride around the Union army, in accordance with the instructions of Lee, he ordered Robertson with his own and Jones' brigades "to withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harpers Ferry, cross the Potomac, and follow the army on its right and rear." These instructions are precise and definite because the location is precise. The force here is a well-known fact and becomes the special object of Lee's apprehension; and to watch it one regiment of cavalry, the 12th Virginia, was detached and properly stationed. The refusal of Halleck to allow this force at Harpers Ferry to join the Army of the Potomac, and which was the occasion of Hooker's resigning, thus, unbeknown to Halleck, to Hooker, to Lee, or any one else, became one of the determining factors in this campaign. For the situation is this: two

brigades of cavalry—Robertson's and Jones'—watching with straining eyes for the movements of an enemy that is moving outside of their possible vision; and the 12th Virginia watching for the movements of a force at Harpers Ferry not allowed to move. But this immobility of Harpers Ferry is not known to Lee; to him this place is a Federal outpost with its ten thousand men; it is to him as McLaw was to McClellan in the Antietam campaign.

The march of Lee's army, like a blazed track through a forest, marked and invited the pursuit along this track, and in the pursuit the force at Harpers Ferry should logically be in the advance; their direct line of pursuit would be west of the mountains. No effort was made to divert pursuit at that opportune time, when Early could have marched without an extra footstep, towards the east, and which was in the instructions given to Stuart. The surmise attributed to the scout, "that the enemy was probably in pursuit of us," thus receives a literal interpretation: "to deter the enemy from advancing further west"; "to relieve the pressure on our rear"; tearing up the track north and south of Chambersburg; placing pickets at Shippensburg; all of these facts mark apprehension of approaching enemy both from the north and the south of the Cumberland valley. Knowledge, reports, rumors necessitating movements to contradict—or verify—are all

magnified by the importance interpreted into such movements; the resultant, the army held west of the mountains till a major force directs its movements.

The two armies are now approaching each other, and now again the question of supplies is prominent. "On the morning of June 30," says Heth, "I ordered . . . Pettigrew to take his brigade to Gettysburg, search the town for army supplies (shoes especially) and return the same day. On reaching the suburbs of Gettysburg General Pettigrew found a large force of cavalry near the town, supported by an infantry force. Under the circumstances he did not deem it advisable to enter the town, and returned as directed to Cashtown." The result of General Pettigrew's observation was reported to his corps commander who reached Cashtown on the night of the 30th. The next morning Heth's division, accompanied by artillery, moved forward towards Gettysburg. "It may not be improper to remark that at this time—9 o'clock on the morning of July 1st—I was ignorant of what force was at or near Gettysburg, and supposed it consisted of cavalry, most probably supported by a brigade or two of infantry." The introduction of this last clause by Heth seems to preclude the idea in his mind, that this force was a portion of the Army of the Potomac, which is consonant with the camp-fire tradition that his

troops "thought the force was Pennsylvania militia," indications, however slight, that the Federal forces were not in this direction. Previous to this, on the night of the 30th, a courier had been dispatched by Hill to Lee, then at Chambersburg, with the information of the day's doing, with orders to Anderson to move forward early the next morning and also word to Ewell, that "I (Hill) intended to advance and discover what was in my front."

The battle was on; no one had ordered it. On the high ground, denuded of trees, on the right side of the Chambersburg pike, where McIntosh's batteries were placed, was probably heard the stereotyped phrase, "When you are ready, Mr. McIntosh, you may open on them." The infantry pressed forward. Rodes' division, under orders "to move toward the balance of the army," then supposed to be at or near Cashtown and headed thither, was turned and came in fortuitously on the right flank of the 1st corps; Carter's artillery, fortuitously coming into position on the high ground, opened upon this flank and upon the ranks of the aimlessly wandering 11th corps. Early, having disregarded his orders to march by a "rough and circuitous road," fortuitously came upon the right flank of the 11th corps.

The following quotation from Rodes' report is inserted without comment: "The troops being

greatly exhausted by their march, and somewhat disorganized by the hot engagement and rapid pursuit, were halted and prepared for further action. I did not change their position materially, or order another attack, for the following reason, among others. In the midst of the engagement just described, the corps commander informed me, through one of his officers, that the general commanding did not want a general engagement brought on; and hence, had it been possible to do so then, I would have stopped the attack at once, but this was, of course, impossible to do then." Ewell also says: "I was informed by him (Lee) that in case we found the enemy's force very large, he did not want a general engagement brought on till the rest of the army came up. It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up, and I determined to push the attack vigorously." Much speculation has been indulged in as to why the attack was not pressed against Cemetery Hill on the afternoon of the 1st; but inasmuch as an adequate reason is shown by the reports that question can be considered as settled. Lee says: "General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army which were ordered to hasten forward." A discretionary order com-

mits no one to anything. Early says: "As soon as my brigades had entered the town, I rode into that place myself, and, after ascertaining the condition of things, I rode to find General Ewell and General Rodes or General Hill, for the purpose of urging an immediate advance upon the enemy before he should recover from his evident dismay, in order to get possession of the hills to which he had fallen back with the remnant of his forces; but before I found either one of these officers, General Smith's son, who was acting as his aide, came to me with a message from the general, stating that a large force of the enemy, consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, was advancing on the York road; and though I had no faith in this report, I thought proper to send General Gordon with his brigade to take charge of Smith's also, and to keep a lookout on the York road, and stop any further alarm." There was no force of the enemy "advancing on the York road." Not only then was this rumor an effective and adequate reason for withdrawing the force at hand from making such an attack, but another whole division of Ewell's corps was stopped from any attack it might make on Culps Hill, by this same rumor. "And shortly after meeting with General Ewell, I communicated my views to him, and was informed that Johnson's division was coming up, and it was determined with this division to get possession of a wooded hill to the

left of Cemetery Hill, which it commanded; and its movements having been delayed by the report of the advance on the York road, no effort to get possession of the wooded hill on the left of the town was made that night."

Up to this time the two divisions of Hill, who "had advanced to discover what was in my front," and who was probably charged with the "stock" injunction about "bringing on a general engagement," etc., and the two divisions of Ewell which were similarly charged had swept onward and driven the Federal troops from the positions they had held, through the town, to the high ground beyond Cemetery Hill.

Had a spectator of this day's proceedings been in a position to see all of the movements, he would have observed the following: Two divisions of Hill's corps marching eastward along the Chambersburg pike; the two leading brigades of this division deployed one on either side of this pike, advancing against an enemy; likewise on either side of this pike a force placed there to oppose their advance; he might have seen a courier from one or the other of these brigades galloping back on this road with the information that the force opposing was so large that there was need of reinforcements; at nearly the same time on looking toward the north he would have seen another force advancing; as to whether they were friend or foe he could not tell until a battle-

flag caught his eye; again looking toward the east he would have seen another force advancing; accompanying all of these approaching bodies were batteries; all were coming from commanding high positions; then to his great surprise, after these different approaching forces, with their effective artillery, had surrounded and driven back the Federals, whose whereabouts were entirely unknown to these on-coming troops until the precise moment of attacking them, he would have learned that these totally divergent attacks, all made and carried on to the proportions of a battle, in which the losses in killed and wounded were more than one third of all those of the three days' conflict here, and made contrary to the orders of the commanding general, showed a greater degree of simultaneousness and co-ordination, than those made on the second and third days when the "concentration" ordered on the morning of June 29, according to the reports, twenty-five miles away at Chambersburg, had had time to perfect itself, and made after the commanding general had examined the position of the enemy, and as the result of his "preparations."

Returning now to the commanding general, we find that he arrived on the field near the place first occupied by the batteries of McIntosh, about two o'clock in the afternoon. His view from here was necessarily limited to the scene immediately

in his front, and a small part of that on his immediate left; his first recorded act was to suggest the placing of a battery on his right to enfilade the enemy's position; the battery was placed, but its fire withheld on account of the representation of General Iverson, who, coming from the town, showed that the opening of fire here would concentrate the fire of the enemy upon his troops. His second recorded act was to reiterate the command to Ewell about not bringing on a general engagement, which was transmitted to Rodes, as referred to before, and assigned by him as one of the reasons why he did not order another attack. The battle of the first day was over.

Near the beginning of Lee's report, when giving the reasons for his contemplated movement into Pennsylvania, he says: "It was thought that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army commanded by General Hooker, and that in any event that army would be compelled to leave Virginia." He now says, "It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time we were unable to await an attack, as the country was

unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and the successes already gained gave hope of a favorable issue." The contradiction in the above statements is evident; nor did Lee come unexpectedly (or otherwise) upon the whole Federal army; nor was it so "difficult and dangerous" to withdraw through the mountains on the night of the first, as on the night of the fourth, for the greater portion of his extensive train was already west of the mountains where Imboden was guarding them; of course the presence of an enemy would make foraging more difficult.

The elation and confidence at Lee's headquarters upon the night of the first can easily be imagined. The palpable evidences of success—the enemy driven from every position he had taken on the west, north and south of Gettysburg—and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue.

The troops were in the position where the events of the day had located them; Johnson's division, halted by a rumor, continues its march to join Ewell's corps on the left.

On the morning of the second, the troops were in a position to make a simultaneous attack upon the Federal lines. The commanding general in

the forenoon makes "the usual and customary examination of the enemy's position." What could he see? Precisely what you, reader, might see should you go there to-day, and take the positions for observation that a commanding general would necessarily be obliged to take to avoid being the target of some prowling sharpshooter or playful artillerist; and that is practically nothing excepting wooded hills, presumably defended. With what force? Unknown, save that the remnants of the 1st and 11th corps are supposed to be here, and presumably the 5th corps, as a reconnoitering party had found a force occupying Culps Hill, and a captured dispatch contained information that this corps would start at four o'clock in the morning, from a distance of four miles, to join the army. An attack will be made, not because of the reasons assigned, but because it is unavoidable—which merges all reasons; it will be made along the line of least seeming resistance; that line is as clearly marked here as at Antietam. To Lee, the heart of the Union army lies in those hills; to seek that heart is his aim. No movement is made until some sight is given; that sight is given when Sickles shows Humphreys' division on the Emmittsburg road. As the tactical movements of the day before had been carried on by division commanders directed by the open extent of the ground, the fortuitous way of the troop's approaching, their superiority

in number rendering front, flank and rear attacks easy and feasible, so now the configuration of the ground, the ignorance of the commander of what was unseen, draw attention only to the seen, and direct movements toward them. Before Lee's view lies Humphreys' division of the 3d corps, challenging and defiant. To him, to Longstreet, and to them all, this array is the extreme left of the Federal line. Even Humphreys did not know where Birney's division was. He says: "My orders were to form with my right resting on the left of the 2d corps, and my left touching General Birney's right, and in line with him; but I could not do both, and when I learned from General Caldwell that he had no orders to move forward, I reported it to General Sickles, and was ordered to form as I did. It was at that time, I think, that I was authorized to call on General Caldwell for support. We were both of the opinion that the distance I was then in front of him would make no difference. . . . I did not see General Sickles in the morning, because I could not leave my division unless sent for. I therefore, at the time, had no knowledge of the general position of the other troops except what I could see on my right" (Birney was on his left); "the ground on my left was hidden by trees. I did not know how the ground was beyond where I could see the troops."

Says Hill: "Pender's division occupying the

crest extending to the right from the theological seminary, and joined by Anderson's, who carried on the line, almost entirely covering the whole front occupied by the enemy. The corps of General Longstreet . . . was on my right and in a line very much at right angles to mine. General Longstreet was to attack the left flank of the enemy, and sweep down his line." Says Anderson, who had the right division of Hill's corps: "The enemy's line was plainly in view about 1200 yards in our front, extending along an opposite ridge somewhat more elevated than that which we occupied. Shortly after the line had been formed I received notice that Longstreet would occupy the ground on the right; that this line would be in a direction nearly at right angles with mine; that he would assault the extreme left of the enemy and drive him toward Gettysburg." Of Hood, he had three separate orders to attack up the Emmittsburg road, though at the time upon advancing he had found out the presence of Birney's division.

There is no report from General Law, commanding the brigade on Longstreet's extreme right, but Robertson, whose brigade was next to Law's, "was ordered to keep my right well closed on———Law's left, and to let my left rest on the Emmittsburg pike." Benning was ordered to follow Law: "Our own first line also became visible, advancing about four hundred yards in

our front. The part of it in our front I took to be Law's brigade, and so I followed it. In truth, it was Robertson's (it does not make any difference, go it with your military tactics), Law's being farther to the right. This I did not discover until late in the fight, a wood on the right concealing from me most of Law's brigade." Says Kershaw: "Arriving at the schoolhouse on the road leading across the Emmittsburg road by the peach orchard, then in possession of the enemy, the lieutenant-general commanding directed me to advance my brigade and attack the enemy at that point, turn his flank, and extend along the cross-road, with my left resting on the Emmittsburg road. In the meantime, examining the position of the enemy, I found him to be in superior force in the orchard, supported by artillery, with a main line of battle intrenched in the rear and extending to and upon the rocky mountain to his left, far beyond the point at which his flank had been supposed to rest. To carry out my instructions would have been, if successful in driving him from the orchard, to present my own right and rear to a large portion of his line of battle. It was understood he (Hood) was to sweep down the enemy's line in a direction perpendicular to our then line of battle." Says Captain Manly: "I was ordered to advance on a road that intersected the Emmittsburg road at right angles a short distance southwest of Gettys-

burg. The road on which we moved was perpendicular to the enemy's line, but it was supposed that their left did not extend to this point of intersection to which we were moving."

Colonel Manning, 3d Arkansas, says: "I was ordered to move against the enemy—and hold my left on the Emmittsburg road." These reports warrant the conclusion that neither Lee nor Longstreet knew that there was a force between the peach orchard and Round Top at the time these orders were given. Not only that, but we must believe that up to the date of Longstreet's report—July 27,—this being before the date of any of his subordinates' reports, he had no clear idea of the location of the enemy or the sequence of events on this second day, for he says, "The enemy's first position along the Emmittsburg road was but little better, in point of strength, than the first position taken by these two divisions (Hood's and McLaw's). Our batteries were opened upon this position, Hood's division pressing upon his left and McLaw's upon his front. He was soon dislodged and driven back upon a commanding hill, which is so precipitous and rough as to render it difficult of ascent. Numerous stone fences about its base added greatly to its strength. The enemy, taking shelter behind these, held them, one after another, with great pertinacity." Longstreet is talking about Humphreys' position along the Emmitts-

burg road. He says: "It was but a little stronger than the first position taken by these two divisions" (Hood's and McLaw's)—this is a complimentary allusion to Longstreet's perspicacity in selecting a stronger position than that which had been first assigned to him—he having come up once before and then retired to come again under the cover of the woods. "He (Humphreys) was soon dislodged and driven back upon a commanding hill, which is so precipitous and rough as to render it difficult of ascent." There was no hill to which Humphreys' forces were driven that corresponds to this description; it might answer to Round Top, but no Federal forces were driven back to that position. Lee's report, dated January, 1864, shows that he had no clear idea of the struggle over Birney's position, as it is entirely confined to the movements of his troops against Humphreys' position on the Emmittsburg road: "After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground." From either one of Lee's reports no one would infer that any part of the battle on the second day took place south of the peach orchard. "The enemy was soon driven from his position on the Emmittsburg road to the cover of a ravine and a line of stone fences at the foot of a ridge in his rear." To add to the ridiculousness of this military comedy, picture the craft of generalship, in moving Longstreet's



Position of Longstreet's Corps

corps into one position, then marching back to come up, *a la* Jackson, again in another way, tiring out the troops by this march;—all done on the conjecture that the Federal troops seen were the extreme left of the Federal line. We have then the orders constantly repeated: "To attack up the Emmittsburg road." Consult the map to see how these orders were carried out, and here again Antietam is repeated. Of Hood's division—the right division of Longstreet's corps —consisting of eighteen regiments, not a single one marched a foot or fired a gun "up the Emmittsburg road." Two of these regiments, in their wandering transit, went over the summit of Big Round Top (that's going up the Emmittsburg road with a vengeance), approaching, on its southern side, to attack the left flank of the 20th Maine—the extreme left of the Union line; all directed by unmanageable and uncontrollable forces of battle, sucked into the maelstrom of strife, as powerless of route as a vessel driven by a tempest, Little Round Top, whose strategic value was so small that neither commander ever discovered it, becoming, by the fierce and unexpected conflict for its possession, like Hugemont at Waterloo, the dramatic climax of this day's battle. Lee had not discovered its importance, neither had Longstreet. Why? Because there was nothing to them, on the faces of either one of these mountains, to show its importance.

Looked at from any position on the Confederate line, Big Round Top appears high and looming, but completely covered with woods; while Vincents Spur (Little Round Top) appears to be the face of the rocky side which is merged into the trees above it. Lee "thought to gain a position from which it was thought our artillery could be brought to bear with effect"; but this position was neither one of the Round Tops, which were never in the contemplation of Lee. The position to which he has reference is Humphreys' on the Emmittsburg road. There was a place on Little Round Top for only one battery, and on Big Round Top no place for even one.

So good an artillerist as Hunt, who was in this vicinity, made no suggestions about placing a battery here. Sykes, who "explained to various staff officers of Sickles—when asking for aid—that it was impossible to give it; the key of the battle-field was intrusted to my keeping, and I could not and would not jeopardize it by a division of my force," did not know where Little Round Top was until the evening of the second day when its position was explained to him by means of a diagram, by one of Crawford's staff officers. The fierce contest for Little Round Top impressed a fictitious importance upon its possession, inducing a belief in Meade's mind of its real importance, leading to the covering of both these mountains with troops on the third day, thereby rendering them

inefficient, by their location, for any aggressive movement, even if he had been so disposed.

Let us now see the simultaneousness of the different attacks upon the Federal lines. Law's brigade upon Longstreet's extreme right began its movements at about four o'clock p.m.; his extreme left brigade starts at 6.30 p.m. On his left, Wilcox, the extreme right brigade of Hill's corps, moves at about 7.15, Perry on his left at 7.30 and Wright about 7.50 p.m. Wilcox says: "Without support on either my right or left, my men were withdrawn, to prevent their entire destruction or capture." Wright says: "It was discovered that the brigade on our right had not only not advanced across the turnpike, but had actually given way, and was rapidly falling back to the rear, while on our left we were entirely unprotected, the brigade ordered to our support having failed to advance." The attack upon Culps Hill was made about 6.30 p.m. and that on East Cemetery Hill by Hoke's and Hay's brigades about 8.45 p.m.

The reader may observe upon consultation of a map, that the division of Rodes, whose line was extended from the left of Hill's corps, encircling Cemetery Hill, made no attack on this day. Rodes furnishes the reason: "Orders given during the afternoon, and after the engagement had opened on the right, required me to cooperate with the attacking force so soon as any

opportunity of doing so with good effect was offered. I thought the opportunity had come and immediately sought General Early with a view of making an attack in connection with him. He agreed with me as to the propriety of attacking and made preparations accordingly. (It may be mentioned here that Ewell had orders to make a diversion in their favor, to be converted into a real attack, if an opportunity offered, as soon as the guns of Longstreet opened.) I hastened to inform the officer commanding the troops that in accordance with our plan, I would attack just at dark and proceeded to make my arrangements, but having to draw my troops out of town by the flank, change the direction of the line of battle, and then traverse a distance of 1200 or 1400 yards, while General Early had to move only half that distance without change of front, the result was that before I drove the enemy's skirmishers in, General Early had attacked, and had been compelled to withdraw.

"After driving in the enemy's skirmishers, the advance line was halted by General Ramseur, who commanded the right brigade, to enable him to report to me certain important facts (for statement of which I refer to his report) he had discovered as to the nature of the ground and of the defenses. These facts, together with Early's withdrawal, of which I had official information, and the increased darkness, convinced me that it

would be a useless sacrifice of life to go on, and a recall was ordered." And Ramseur's report to which reference was made states: "I was ordered to advance, obeyed this order until within two hundred yards of the enemy's position where batteries were discovered in position to pour upon our lines direct, cross and enfilade fires. Two lines of infantry behind stone walls and breastworks were supporting these batteries. The strength and position of the enemy's batteries and their supports induced me to halt and confer with General Doles, and with him to make representations of the character of the enemy's position, and ask further instructions. In answer, received an order to retire quietly to a deep road over three hundred yards in rear."

The battle of this day is over. The troops are exactly where events have left them. It is a peculiarity of battle-fields, that a position held or obtained after hard fighting is interpreted into a strong position no matter whether taken by accident or by design.

The condition of affairs then at the beginning of the third day is as follows: The ground taken by the Federal troops on the first day wrenched from them, and they driven back to Cemetery Hill and Culps Hill; the ground taken by them on the second day taken from them, and they driven back to the Cemetery ridge. Like two prize-fighters in a ring, one blow had been

given that staggered the opponent, a second had brought him trembling to his knees; the conclusion is warranted that the third blow will finish the work.

With these palpable evidences of success, as plain to every soldier as to the commanding general, there can be no backward movement. The cannon brought forward to the Emmittsburg road on the second day invite other cannon to this position; to turn back these assembled batteries along this road, assertive of power and destruction of the enemy before them, to stay this current of thought and feeling, to swerve this huge machine of war, would be the reversal of a natural law—the law of inertia. When those cannons turn backwards, the army turns and not before. They are the iron prow of this machine, whose momentum, unhindered and unstayed, can not be swerved, but must go on. And Lee says: "The result of this (the second) day's operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged."

It was the result of both days' operations that induced this belief. Unfortunately for the realization of this "proper concert of action" idea, the

two opposing forces were too near one another during the night of the second, at the southern foot of Culps Hill. During this night pickets were firing, and even volleys were exchanged. A shot in the night, in the near presence of the enemy, has a loud and significant speech; it is a command more trenchant and stirring than an officer's voice or a bugle-call; it speaks intimately to each soldier; it causes him to grasp his musket and cock it, and a cocked gun needs but little provocation to go off, and when many of them go off, the battle is on. The soldiers at the foot of that hill began a fight of their own ordering, and when daylight came it was well under way. The Confederate private had not been made acquainted with the "proper concert of action" idea, and, as if resentful, he took advantage of the opportunity to show his independence and start a fight of his own. He found the Federal private not disinclined to the proposition; each one knew that the general commanding "had ordered it when it was over"; the annoyance and irritation each was causing the other permeated the mass, and drove them to the terrible conflict. The tense feeling and fever could not wait for orders, and did not care for them. The privates' guns here had upset "plans," and six hours of furious fighting on the Confederate left was an appalling handicap to a simultaneous attack along the whole line. And again we are intro-

duced to the commanding influence of rumors. Says Ewell: "Half an hour after Johnson attacked, and when too late to recall him, I received notice that Longstreet would not attack until ten o'clock; but as it turned out, his attack was delayed till after two o'clock. In Johnson's attack, the enemy abandoned a portion of their works in disorder. Repeated reports from the cavalry on our left that the enemy were moving heavy columns of infantry to turn General Johnson's left, at last caused him, about one o'clock, to evacuate the works gained. These reports reached me also, and I sent——of my staff, with a party of cavalry, to my left to investigate them, who found them to be without foundation."

Stuart, who had been sent around the Union army "to gain information and collect supplies" arrives at Gettysburg on July 2. It is difficult to see wherein there was the slightest failure on his part to do the whole work assigned to him. He arrives at Gettysburg in the night of the second, and on the following morning moves forward to a position on the left of the Confederate line. The suggestion that it was a part of Lee's "plan" to attack the Union rear with Stuart's cavalry at the time of the assault on the Union centre, is entirely gratuitous. Lee says: "After its arrival (the cavalry) it engaged the enemy's cavalry with unabated spirit, and effectively protected our left"—the purpose for which it was

put there. The suggestion of such an attack came from Stuart and not from Lee.

It will be observed that the movement on the second day by Longstreet's corps was an attack pure and simple, no movement in any way toward the protection of his right flank; while on the third day, the time spent by Longstreet either in his "preparations" to guard his flank, or for any other cause, was an adequate reason for his delay in making his assault; and this, coupled with the privates' battle on Culps Hill in the morning of the 3d, the non-movement of any force on Longstreet's left, the slight delay and deviation in the march of Perry and Wilcox on the right of Longstreet's attacking column, express the relation between the real and any "proper concert of action." And when are added to the above these congregated batteries of artillery pouring forth their destructive missiles, to make a desolate path of death along which this triumphant foe might advance, ceasing suddenly before their work is done, dumb and exhausted, by the simple failure of that which was to feed these monsters—powder—they stand as the greatest monument on this field,—to human ignorance. Success would have shown no greater intelligence, no greater bravery; it would simply have put a larger halo of glory on the brows of those who said the most and did the least.

Chapter Four.

THE UNION SIDE.

When the Confederate army started on its northward march, it moved from the front of the Army of the Potomac under Hooker, then on the north side of the Rappahannock. It may be remarked here that a great change had taken place in the thinking of the North at this period, compared with its sentiments previous to the first battle of Bull Run. Events had forced a readjustment of ideas. Such outposts of interest as the "preservation of the Union," on the one hand, and the "right of secession," on the other hand, might still engage the attention of the academy, but not of the field. Mr. Lincoln's call then was "for the militia of the several States to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand men . . . to repossess the places, forts and property that have been seized from the Union"; but now the instructions given to Hooker—who has many more than seventy-five thousand men—are "to keep in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harpers Ferry, either directly or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them."

This first call is the language of offensive movement; the instructions to Hooker contemplate a defensive attitude, and they satisfy the general interest until a more specific interest is threatened. So compelling is this general interest to protect Washington, that Hooker's recommendation to attack that portion of Lee's army still remaining at Fredericksburg, is disapproved; and when, on June 14, news is received of the surrounding of Winchester and Martinsburg by Ewell's forces, the incongruity of the situation, due as much to Mr. Lincoln as to any one, is so evident—an immense army in the field, and yet allowing two places occupied by Federal troops to be overcome—that it prompts Mr. Lincoln to utter his *bon mot:* "If the head of the animal is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the Plank Road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?" The instructions given to Hooker were as specific as could be given, when no one knew where to turn or what to do; and sufficiently general to cover almost any action. Honors were "easy" between Lee and Hooker during those first days of June; neither one knew where the other was, or what were his intentions; and each was in a sea of speculation as to the other's whereabouts. In this limitless sea of conjecture, where time was spent in verifying rumors, sending a force here and one there, the

mass-movement of the Army of the Potomac showed the same vacillations that one might see who witnesses the charging of a large balloon with gas; partially charged it sways to and fro in response to the different currents of air that touch its form, until, fully charged, it rises up and pursues the strongest current. So here, this army, its component parts agitated by rumors, crossing and recrossing the Rappahannock, as did the three divisions of the 6th corps, sways this way and that, till, charged with purpose, the whole body sweeps onward in the strongest current, because the strongest current is the resultant of rumors. Where the two armies will meet can no more be determined than the meeting of two clouds. Where they will meet? Nay, where they are.

Hooker's chief of staff writes on June 17: "My impression . . . is that Lee is in as much uncertainty as to our whereabouts and what we are doing, as we are as to his." Again the next day he writes: "We have not settled where Lee with Longstreet and Ewell is yet." On June 18, Halleck writes Hooker: "Officers and citizens are in a big stampede. They are asking me why does not General Hooker tell where Lee's army is; he is nearest it." On June 22, Meade, then commanding the 5th corps, wrote to Howard, adding in a postscript, "I don't know what we are going to do. I have had no communication

from headquarters for three days." When the mill owners along the banks of the Antietam shall see their flour taken and paid for in Confederate money and carried away; when the farmers of Maryland and Pennsylvania shall see their grain, their cattle and horses taken; when the merchants of the cities and towns of Pennsylvania shall see their stock of goods shipped away for the supply of Lee's army,—then exact and definite information will begin to pour in of the number and whereabouts of the Confederate army.

These unorganized and voluntary news propagators, impelled by self-interest, will furnish what service alone can not obtain. They are the voice of an aroused people, despoiled and threatened to be despoiled; and that voice will wheel corps into line—while the commander-in-chief will be thinking that he is directing the army's movements,—will send out cavalry on definite purposes, and will quicken the footsteps of their compatriots in the ranks, to their succor. Witness the letter of the 2d Penn. Reserves, asking to be ordered "within the border of our State for her defense."

The general interest of the North for the protection of Washington yields to the importunity of the specific interest in protecting Pennsylvania. What matters it who commands the Union army —except the pleasure it gives to the commander? or whether or not it has a commander? What

matters it whether Hooker resigns, or who takes his place? The figure-head pleases the æsthetic sense, but adds no force or intelligence to the movement; this can not be stopped or guided by one man in the pursuit, for the whole North is behind it.

Under the order appointing Meade commander of the army, were these instructions: "You will, therefore, manœuvre and fight in such a manner as to cover the Capital and also Baltimore as far as circumstances will permit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him so as to give him battle." Thus while Washington, trembling in the contemplation of the perspectives it saw resulting from the "plans" it had interpreted into the movements of Lee, is sending its instructions to the commanding general, based upon these imaginings, the people of the North are transmitting their message through ten thousand subtle influences, to the Army of the Potomac. Their message is short; it does not need a heading of "headquarters" to make it authoritative; it is terse, it is war: "Find the enemy and fight him." The order appointing Meade to the command, and the "instructions" were received at Fredericktown on June 27. Meade writes to Halleck: "If Lee is moving for Baltimore I expect to get between his main army and that place. If he is

crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon General Couch, with his force, holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle, which I shall endeavor to do." (Meade had as wholesome an opinion of "Pennsylvania militia," as had Lee.) This "plan" of operations was approved by Halleck, as he would have approved of any well-sounding phrase.

Neither one of these movements was seriously contemplated by Lee; neither one of them ever took place; the preparations, therefore, to meet either one or both of these movements resulted, by circumstances, in that which was actually done, like "Dow's Luck," in striking gold when he was after water. The reliance here expressed "upon Couch's holding them until I shall fall upon his (Lee's) rear" is complimentary to the prowess of the militia of Pennsylvania, who thus are recognized as determining factors in Meade's movements, as they were in those of Lee; though, at this time, Couch's forces consisted of about 16,000 troops, whom he (Couch) thought could be whipped "all to pieces in an open field, by five thousand regulars." We now come to a copy of Meade's circular letter of July 1—not the original, which was in the handwriting of Meade, and which was called for by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and was not produced, but a copy emended by Butterfield, chief of staff, of which the following are quotations:

"*Headquarters Army of the Potomac,*
"Taneytown, July 1, 1863.

"From information received, the commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz., the relief of Harrisburg, and the prevention of the intended invasion of Philadelphia, etc., beyond the Susquehanna. It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive until the enemy's movements or position should render such an operation certain of success. If the enemy assume the offensive and attack it is intention, after holding them in check sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other impedimenta, to withdraw the army from its present position, and form line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Manchester, the general direction being that of Pipe Creek. For this purpose, General Reynolds, in command of the left, will withdraw the force at present at Gettysburg, two corps by the road to Taneytown and Westminster, and, after crossing Pipe Creek, deploy toward Middleburg. The corps at Emmittsburg will be withdrawn, via Mechanicsville to Middleburg, or if a more direct route can be found leaving Taneytown to the left, or withdrawn direct to Middleburg. General Slocum will assume command of the two corps at Hanover and Two Taverns and withdraw them, via

Union Mills, deploying one to the right and one to the left, after crossing Pipe Creek, connecting on the left with General Reynolds, and communicating his right to General Sedgwick at Manchester, who will connect with him and form the right. The time for falling back can only be developed by circumstances. Whenever such circumstances arise as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling back and assuming this general line indicated, notice of such movement will be at once communicated to these headquarters, and to all adjoining corps commanders. The second corps now at Taneytown will be held in reserve in the vicinity of Uniontown and Frizellburg to be thrown to the point of strongest attack, should the enemy make it. In the event of these movements being necessary the trains will all be sent to the rear of Westminster."

It is noticed in the above that no movement is prescribed for the 6th corps—none was necessary, as its designation on that day was Manchester. It is no wonder that after such an elaborate plan, of which the above is but a partial copy, Meade should have tenaciously clung to it. Its promulgation was after a circular on June 30, in which he says: "The commanding general has received information that the enemy are advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg." Three points of this circular are presented for consideration—The first: "The movement of the

army in this direction has been accomplished, viz., the relief of Harrisburg"; second: "The prevention of the enemy's intended invasion of Philadelphia etc., beyond the Susquehanna"; and third: "It is his intention after holding them in check sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other impedimenta." Of the first it may be said that "the movement of the army in this direction" had not had any influence of diverting an attack upon Harrisburg, that function having been performed by the Pennsylvania militia. Of the second, "the prevention of the enemy's intended invasion of Philadelphia etc.," it may be said there was no serious intention of invading Philadelphia; of the third, something will be said later. Continuing the consideration of Meade's intentions we find Reynolds ordered on June 30th to Gettysburg, and the 11th corps on the same day ordered thither or within supporting distance.

After the circular letter of July 1, recalling all of the corps, Meade informs Reynolds that "The movement of your corps to Gettysburg was ordered before the positive knowledge of the enemy's withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration was received; in other words, had I known that the enemy had withdrawn from Harrisburg, your command would not have been ordered to Gettysburg," and as late as 2.30 p.m. of July 1, Hancock was directed, in view of the

possibility that Reynolds had not received "the order to withdraw his command by the route through Taneytown" . . . "that you proceed with your troops out on the direct road to Gettysburg from Taneytown. When you find that General Reynolds is covering that road, instead of withdrawing by Emmittsburg (which it is feared he may do) you will withdraw to Frizellburg, as directed in the circular of direction for the positions issued this morning." These instructions indicate Meade's intentions as to the 1st, 2d, and 11th corps up to this time. The third corps had made preparations for falling back in pursuance of this order. Sickles says: "The principal part of my train had been already ordered to the rear by a staff officer from headquarters"; specific instructions were sent to the commanders of the 5th, 6th, and 12th corps to move trains to Westminster in accordance with this circular.

But while headquarters are exercised about plans and movements based upon rumors and reports devoid of perspective or relation, Buford, in his search for information, is so committed to the conditions of that search that he is drawn into the full current of battle; the first corps comes to his assistance and is swept into the same current, then the 11th corps; Sickles, in response to urgent calls from Howard, on his own responsibility and in response to the spirit of his

corps, moves up, satisfying the etiquette of the occasion by a judicious use of ink, in notifying the commanding general of his going and the exigencies of the occasion, by pushing forward the stalwart soldiers of this corps. The battle of the first day is over. Superior numbers in an open field had done what it is expected they might always do under similar conditions, and the shelter and protection of Cemetery Hill are sought. The watching and anxious eyes of officers and privates turn now and then to see whether the enemy will pursue and here attack; nerves grow quieter when breastworks (the thing that military imbecility up to this time had never learned or countenanced) quickly appear, and retreating artillery is placed to command the hill's approaches. Among those generals gathered, from whatever motive, into a "consultation" in the evening, who would have dared to mention a "plan" in its application to the events of this day? A request sent to a commanding officer, and the bearer killed in carrying it, or the commander not found till too late for its effect; a regiment ordered to march here or there and an unseen foe almost sweeping it out of existence in the march; the ardor of the conflict impelling to unheard-of and bizarre exploits; a day of accidents, some fortunate and some disastrous; movements ordered, and carried out exactly contrary to orders; a railroad cut occupied

for protection and this cut becoming an ambuscade; a rush of force from one place to gain an apparent advantage, the very occasion of losing a real advantage; hunger, thirst, exhaustion, contempt for leaders, desperation and defeat. What have these generals to say in this consultation, that can not be said, and is not said just as well and just as intelligently by the ranks? Never more valiant and tenacious fighting, and to what purpose? Reynolds dead. The commanding general miles away. Hancock, sent by Meade to take command, reaches the hill just as these fugitives arrive. No wonder that in the gloom of that hour, seeing far away to the left Buford's cavalry, he should have spoken of their inspiring presence; for the factors of inspiration at that moment were few and those that appeared were magnified. "Hancock was nervous," says Schurz. Wonderful! Just as though it took more courage to pose before an admiring troop than to tramp the picket line alone in the darkness! All that these generals knew there on Cemetery Hill was known by the ranks, for their knowledge had been poured out in conjuring stragglers into line—the coming of the 3d corps, the nearness of the 5th, and the 12th, and, best of all, the night. One thing perhaps the ranks did not know, and that was Meade's circular letter of the morning. Its contents were known to the generals there assembled, and it was yet

operative—that line of defense selected by the commanding general! Here chaos, there symmetry. Here the prospect of continued defeat, there the prospect of victory. Here a "ground not unfavorable, with good troops," there a favorable ground even with inefficient troops. Who knows anything about the efficiency or inefficiency of troops until after a battle is over? But the contingency mentioned in the circular letter had happened, to wit: "If the enemy assume the offensive and attack, it is his (Meade's) intention, after holding them in check sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other impedimenta, to withdraw the army from its present position, etc." The enemy had attacked, he had been held in check; Hancock had been sent by Meade to examine and report; he had come; in his report he commits himself to—nothing; his report is absolutely colorless. The only definite thing in it is in accord with the circular letter: "I have sent all the trains back." And while the "plan" still is operative, the instinct of self-preservation is prompting to movements that present it in the light of a "New Year's resolution," holding the reins over the habits of a life, but powerless to control them.

What leads the army to stay here? The army itself. Place a battery on that commanding hill, and it speaks its power and security to those who see it; place a breastwork here and there, and the

spirit of safety springs up as the breastwork rises; crowd out of the imagination the nearness of a foe by the presence of a friend, and forebodings give place to rest; people a piece of woods with brothers in arms, say aloud that "the 2d corps is near," that "the 3d corps is on the way hither," that "the 5th corps is coming," that "the 12th is near by," that "the 6th will soon be here," and the sense of support and assistance permeates the mass and it can but stay. These are old sayings, as old as the hills, but always new to those in need. Conjure with sight of muskets, breastworks, batteries and flags, with names of masses —"the 2d corps," "the 3d corps," "the 5th corps," "the 6th corps," "the 12th corps"—and leave it to the historian to invert the order of influence and show the things that were not.

All of the corps are here, and contrary to a "plan"; for circumstances have taken control, and individuals are swayed by them. The night of the first day passes.

In the afternoon of the second day, the movement of the 3d corps is made to its position on the Emmittsburg road. Meade says of this movement: "He (Sickles) had taken a position very much in advance of what it had been intended that he should take." The opinion that this was a weak position has been shared by many since then, especially by those to whom it is conclusive evidence that the failure of the Confeder-

ates to advance any further than they did advance, was the proper position for the 3d corps to have occupied; and besides, it is a little humiliating to military pretension to be wounded in its pride of opinion, and that, too, by a civilian officer.

But though the commanding general on this occasion was nearer to the movement of Sickles than ordinarily happens in battle, he had no more to do with it than those who share his opinion. This is our contention: that a commanding general in battle is the most unimportant factor of effectiveness, and the most important factor of uneffectiveness; and the Sickles episode supports these propositions. It is not proposed here to discuss the contest that has been waged ever since this second day of July, between the partisans of Meade and Sickles; that issue is no more relevant to our theme than the discussions between the partisans of Lee and Longstreet.

As we saw before that Lee had no knowledge that Birney's division of the 3d corps was between the Peach Orchard and Little Round Top, until the attack was actually begun, so Meade had no knowledge of the position of Longstreet's corps on his left front until after their batteries opened; for Berdan's sharpshooters and the 3d Maine Regiment had entered the woods "some distance beyond our extreme left . . . and moved forward parallel with the Emmittsburg road. We soon came upon the enemy, and

drove them sufficiently to discover three columns in motion in rear of the woods, changing direction as it were, by the right flank." This force was Wilcox's brigade, the extreme right of Hill's corps and nearly a mile to the northeast of the peach orchard. It is inconceivable that Longstreet's corps could then have been in position. This reconnoisance was reported about two o'clock to Birney; Longstreet's corps coming into position about 3.30 o'clock p.m. As Sickles moves forward to the Emmittsburg road, Hancock, who was with his corps at the time, says: "I knew that the fight was expected to commence, but the object of General Sickles in moving to the front I could not conceive. I recollect looking on and admiring the spectacle."

Hancock's perplexity can be imagined. One of the most rigid military theories had been disregarded; the line, whose breakage on the following day by Hancock elicited from him, in his note to Meade, a kind of apology, "I had to break the line to attack the enemy," etc., had been disjointed by a civilian officer. Failing to get definite information from the commanding general, though making proper efforts, he (Sickles) had acted on his own responsibility, and taken a position where his artillery could be, and was, effectively used.

We can imagine more than Hancock's perplexity; he said, "I can recollect looking on

and admiring the spectacle." He said this in Washington nine months after that July afternoon, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. The impression produced on Hancock by this spectacle was a totally different thing from his expression of that impression nine months afterwards, or his expression at the time. We can easily believe any word he may then have uttered was not uncomplimentary to Sickles. It may be he said: "D——n him, he's a fighter, and wouldn't stay there tucked away in the woods." What he felt was the feeling expressed by Sickles, who says: "My requests to General Hancock for supports were promptly met." What Hancock felt was the feeling that made him promptly meet those requests. Hancock presumably had the same feelings that Sickles had; the same feelings that every one had who saw the movement—the sturdy lines of the 3d corps marching up to that commanding position on the Emmittsburg road, than which few places could be found better for artillery on that whole field, and which was the same position occupied by Lee the next day, with a much larger break in the line. What men said before, during, and after that battle are different things. Sykes, quite far away on the Taneytown road, giving supper to his troops, who could easily say to a staff officer coming for assistance, "My men are making coffee and I will be up in time," was not the

same Sykes as when coming in close contact with the moving troops. Years of formalism and routine must have their sequent results.

The staff officers of Sickles begging for assistance are coolly met with the remark, "It is impossible for me to give it; the key to the battle is intrusted to my keeping, and I can not and will not jeopardize it by a division of my forces"; but once brought into "the push"; once brought where the current of battle is flowing; once brought face to face with a vibrant voice, two flashing eyes, the white face and set lips of a man who has a message, "Hot blood leaps o'er the cold decree," and the soldier's response is given. The spirit *de l'armée* is manifesting itself now that the occasion is calling for it. That corps, a part of which marched ten miles under Kearny, to come to the relief of Hooker on the Peninsula, the story of which every camp-fire had heard since, wants aid. Meade, who has been on the field and officially proclaimed Sickles' position defective, is seen personally directing Lockwood's brigade to its assistance. The movement is on, it needs no commanding general and it takes none; leaders fall and others take their places, for the ranks now lead, changing by their stubbornness formal orders, and forcing movements contrary to them; swaying and rushing into places of advantage and compelling support in places of disadvantage; vacating places

only by orders, that they and they alone knew were invincible. Boys of seventeen, eighteen and twenty years of age, and recruits, who had never before been in battle, impressionable and susceptible, whose enthusiasm is received with surly kindliness by veterans, impart their *elan* till all are swirled into the currents of battle, into the vortex of strife; a fence, a rock, a knoll, a wood becomes an object of contention, to guard which means the struggle and the loss; and the gaining of which means the destruction of the other. The contest is life or death; trees become allies; fences, supporting forces; gulches, musketry; and rocks, cannon. The conflict ceases, each glad of the approaching night.

On the night of the second day after the contest was over, there was a council of war at Meade's headquarters; and the first question propounded was: "Under the existing circumstances, is it advisable for this army to remain in its present position, or retire to another, nearer its base of supplies?" It may surprise the general reader of history, who has read the story of Gettysburg, and knows the importance that has been attributed to it, to learn that such a question at such a time was propounded by the Union commander. Very likely his preconceived ideas of a general who has been so often and so unhappily likened to a chess-player may receive a shock when this episode is brought to his attention. Here was

the whole army assembled. Why was this question propounded, and why was the conclusion "to stay and fight it out"?

Among those generals assembled in that council, there was one isolated by his commanding and responsible position, and consequently subject to influences and considerations different from those that governed and controlled the others; that one was Meade. Of the nine generals there, four were division commanders temporarily in command of a corps. All of them but one were professional soldiers; not one of them was charged with a larger responsibility than the limited control of his corps; therefore a better representative of the spirit of the army, a better conductor of its feeling, than the commander. The most serious events of life always have their farcical features. It has passed into a proverb that "No man is a hero to his valet." Warren, who was present at this council, says: "I knew what the opinion of the officers was; I talked with nearly all of them, and everybody was for fighting it out; there was no necessity for a council." A memorandum, made by Hancock, and found among Meade's papers, says, "Puzzled about the practicability of retiring." The decision of that council had been determined by events; they had constructed that moral environment that no council could change, and no council could even comprehend. The

decision of that council had been expressed before these generals had had an opportunity to pass upon the academic presentation of this question, by men who wore no straps or stars, whose uniforms did not fit their sinewy limbs, whose caps were awry, who had no commissions with official signatures attached to them—and which officialism, in its narrowness, confounded with real authority; by men charged with the sentiment of the communities from which they came. On this field? No. In the lumbering regions, in the factories, in the workshops, behind the counters, in the colleges, on the farms. By men who showed all the "strategy" that was ever shown in that war—for the only "strategy" ever shown was when the volunteers of the North and South took the oath of allegiance, and were mustered into service—that done, all the rest followed, like the results of a new birth; by men who marched to the firing line, not with joy but seriousness; who neither knew nor cared that the question they had settled would be passed upon by a "council of generals"; who yelled to a staff officer who, they thought, was bringing an order to fall back: "No retreat!"—by men who neither knew nor cared, in the many changes of army commanders, who now commanded, provided he was a fighter; who did know that a northern State was invaded by an enemy, and that enemy was before them; by men who had joined the ranks like the

minute men of Concord and Lexington, roused by a voice in the night, saying "Farewell!" at the gate, and vanishing into the darkness to meet the foe; by men who knew how to handle rifles and obey reasonable commands; by men who helped to make possible and sequent Cemetery Hill, the wheat-field, Devil's Den, the peach orchard and the repulse on Culps Hill and on the Federal centre on the third day—Stone's brigade, who came on to the field on the first day shouting: "We have come to stay!" shouting it, too, with no thought of record and when facing bullets; shouting it because full of fight and defiance.

They expressed the mood of this army. The question had been settled by the army—the mass. That was the object of the long and tiresome march from the Rappahannock almost to the Susquehanna; that was the object for which these soldiers came here tramping in the heat and the dust, cheered by the people through whose villages they had passed; welcomed by the fear-stricken inhabitants of the country, and hailed as deliverers. Men of intelligence and spirit, whose leaders, trained along the lines of tradition and unreality, looking not through their eyes but through their prejudices, never knew and could not comprehend. That they got here was not in pursuance of a "plan," but in opposition to it. Men who want to fight, a people who want their sons, husbands and fathers to fight, find out

where the enemy is; soldiers who want to fight select good positions for that purpose instinctively and naturally; they need no commanders to perform that useless task for them; that is why we see the 3d corps out on the Emmittsburg road, unsupported, because a support would destroy the symmetry of a line!

The attack is made on the Federal centre on the third day by the troops of Pickett, of Wilcox, of Perry—again the absence of co-ordination. One feature of this battle, wanting on the first day, when Lee was absent, and prominent on the second and third days, when he was here, must attract attention, and throws light upon the movement or want of movement of any part of the Federal army to make a counter-attack, after the repulse of the last day. In all of the aggressive movements of these two days is noted the absence of co-ordination. This is inherent in movements of collective bodies. There are the different motives of the subordinate leaders, their temperaments, their sympathy with or antipathy toward the movement or the commander; the unlooked-for circumstance, trivial in itself but controlling; prejudices, superstitions, presentiments; the soggy or unyielding ground to be traveled over—in a word, the *terrain*, the most important factor of all and the most unknown. To move any part of the Federal army from its defensive position in a counter-attack on this day would

be to exactly duplicate the unco-ordinated movements of the enemy on this and the second day. Again what mean the references found in the reports of McClellan on the battle of Antietam, and in the report of Lee on this battle, to "preparations to attack"? Simply that time must be employed, and a time commensurate with the body to be moved, and the circumstances that surround it. What preparations were made for a counter-attack here? Absolutely none. The expectation of the army was to act on the defensive; the vote of the council on the night of the second was "to stay and fight it out"—to await an attack. On every conceivable portion of this field had been placed troops to guard against possible assaults (perfectly legitimate in accordance with a "system"—which could well, with sufficient men, have guarded every nook and cranny, but nonsensical in the light of events, or in the light of superior knowledge which, had there been any, could not tolerate such economic waste). The law of inertia, by which a body at rest tends to remain so, and a body in motion to continue so, can not be set aside by willing.

Hancock, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, says: "I think that our lines should have advanced immediately, and I believe we should have won a great victory. I was very confident that the advance would be made. General Meade told me

before the fight that if the enemy attacked me he intended to put the 5th and 6th corps on the enemy's flank; I, therefore, when I was wounded, and lying down in my ambulance and about leaving the field, dictated a note to General Meade, and told him if he would put in the 5th and 6th corps I believed he would win a great victory." Fortunately we have Hancock's note to Meade, which we submit to the reader's consideration.

"*Headquarters, Second Corps*
"July 3, 1863.

"Although I repelled a tremendous attack, yet on seeing it from my left and advancing to the right, I, much to my sorrow, found that the twelve guns on my salient had been removed by some one, whom I call upon you to hold accountable, as without them, with worse troops, I should certainly have lost the day. I arrived just in time to put a small battalion of infantry in the place occupied by those two small batteries.

"I have never seen a more formidable attack, and if the 5th and 6th corps have pressed up the enemy will be destroyed. The enemy must be short of ammunition, as I was shot with a ten-penny nail. I did not leave the field till the victory was entirely secured and the enemy no longer in sight. I am badly wounded, though I trust not seriously. I had to break the line to attack the enemy in flank on my right, where the

enemy was most persistent after the first attack was repelled. Not a Rebel in sight upright when I left. The line should be immediately restored and perfected. General Caldwell is in command of the corps, and I have directed him to restore the line." Not a single suggestion in this note to Meade to make a counter-attack. The only suggestion of any kind militates against the idea "that our lines should have been advanced," so far as they concerned his own; for in this note to Meade, he says: "The line should be restored and perfected. I have directed him (Caldwell, not to hold himself in readiness to advance, but) to restore the line." The allusion to the 5th and 6th corps supports his statement that Meade had mentioned to him his "intentions"; but the gossip of headquarters is of no more importance than the gossip of the ranks. It is, without doubt, pleasing to those who have committed themselves to expressions of disapproval upon Meade's failure to have performed some military leger-demain by which the Army of Northern Virginia should have been entirely exterminated on this day, to find the support of military experts given to their opinions, or to compare, to the disparagement of Meade, what was done with what their military paragons would have done in the premises. The movements of this army and the acts of its commander on this day are facts. Their true perspective is other facts: the ground,

the trees, the knolls, the rocks, the fences, the roads, the positions of the different regiments, and not opinions. A, B and C are in a room. B goes out into the street. A says B has gone toward the north. C says that B has gone toward the south. A and C become angry with each other because each is desirous of impressing his opinion on the other. In what direction B has gone is a fact, and on B's returning he says that he went toward the west. Hancock, in his letter to Meade, as in his other letter to him, commits himself to nothing.

Sedgwick, in his testimony before the same committee, was asked the question: "You had five brigades of yours convenient to the point of attack?" "Yes, sir, in close vicinity." The nearest brigade of Sedgwick—Nevin's right regiment—was nearly a mile away from the point of attack; Nevin's left regiment was more than a mile away in an air line. Torbett's brigade was immediately in rear of Nevin's, formed in a square on the four edges of a wood, Bartlett's brigade still farther away. Russell's brigade was more than two miles away, but late in the afternoon "it was brought up in rear of our line." Grant's brigade remained two miles away. Sedgwick's headquarters were more than a mile away from the point of attack. Of the 5th corps, McCandless' brigade was in the exact position to which it had advanced the night before; its

centre four-fifths of a mile from the right flank of the attacking column, (horrible to relate, beyond the line with no supports on either flank!) Sweitzer's and Vincent's brigades were in the rear of Nevin's, and the rest of the 5th corps stretched out from Sykes' headquarters, still farther away than Sedgwick's, to the summit of Big Round Top—there certainly could never have been any idea of making a counter-attack with any troops perched away on the summit of Big Round Top. It is fair to assume that neither Sedgwick nor Sykes knew anything about this attack until after it was over. Sedgwick was asked: "In what condition did that repulse leave the artillery of the enemy at that time?" and answered, "I have no means of knowing; I was not on that part of the field." Circumstances had so placed Hancock that when he saw the powerlessness of this attack—when it was over—by a very natural association of ideas, the strength of the 5th and the 6th corps and Meade's "intentions" could easily come into his mind, as it probably did to the mind of every one who saw the result, that then was the opportunity to strike; but to strike with an imaginary force is a dream.

But the commanding general is in the saddle. He comes to Little Round Top accompanied by several general officers. "He asked what command it was that was occupying the line of stone

wall. He was answered that it was my (Crawford's) division. He directed General Sykes to order me to advance and clear the woods in my front; and if I found too large a force I was not to engage them." This order received between 4.30 and five o'clock in the afternoon reached McCandless at six o'clock. At the same hour Nevin received order to support this reconnoissance, and at about five o'clock Bartlett was ordered by Sedgwick "to co-operate with Brigadier General Crawford . . . in a movement against the supposed position of General Hood's division." Events had again determined movements without consulting the commanding general. Was it those two regiments of Bartlett's brigade, which may have been passed by Meade on his way to Round Top, and the sight of McCandless in advance that prompted even this movement?

The day is over, a drenching rainstorm follows. The dead and the wounded on this field, swept away by the rising streams near which they had fallen or crawled to slake their thirst, were as powerless to stay their downward flow, as, when living, to stay or determine the currents of battle which brought them within the rush of their waters. The Northern and the Southern wave, as little directed by intelligence as the waves of the sea, here met and commingled their fury and their force.

Not a successful charge made on that field, whose opportunity was not first seen, and whose movement was not initiated by the men nearest the foe; not an unsuccessful charge made on that field that was not "ordered"—the charge of the 1st Minnesota Regiment by Hancock, that of Farnsworth by Kilpatrick, that of the 2d Massachusetts Regiment, presumably by Slocum, that of Hoke's and Hay's brigades on East Cemetery Hill, and that of Pickett by Lee.

The reliance of the generals was on the mass. The question was asked, "How many men have we?" "How many men have the enemy?" The reliance of the men was also there. Schurz says, "On the morning of the second, Meade, after another sweeping glance over the field, added, as if repeating something to himself, 'Well, we may fight it out here just as well as anywhere.'" Wonderful, that with 95,000 men under his control, all within easy supporting distance of one another, and the 6th corps then coming up, he should thus have expressed himself! This battle was in no sense a battle between the commanders. Antietam was not. Nor was either of them by their direction. "The campaigns went on independently in their own way, without conforming at all to the plans of the gentlemen commanding, but as a result of the real relations of the armies in motion. All these intersecting and conflicting plans represented in

the higher spheres of authority, the faithfully reflected image of what ought to be accomplished." It was the North against the South. It was the solid masses of men on these different parts of this field, supported by, and relying on, other masses. The maximum unit of collective efficiency was the regiment; it needed and took no directive power beyond itself.

The motive leading the Confederate army here was food—inherently sacred, though in this case stealing the property of others; but justifiable to the war-conscience, and according to the ethics of war. The motive of the Army of the Potomac in coming here was expressed in the call of Curtin, urging the inhabitants of Pennsylvania "to promptly fill up the ranks of the corps, the duties of which will be mainly the defense of our own homes, firesides, and property from devastation"—motive sufficiently strong and sacred to men who knew the value of homes, firesides, and property.

The battle is over, and the Southern army is drawing back; who knows whether it is retreating or not? Who knows anything about its "intentions"?

Again the illustration of the movements of a balloon, while being charged with gas, applies to the movements of the Army of the Potomac. The mass sways to and fro. Slocum on the right advances "to ascertain the position of the

enemy"; Howard is pushed forward into the town to see "if the enemy is still there." The rain of the 4th of July adds its influence; the cavalry is sent out on the road to Cashtown; the 6th corps follows the Fairfield road; every rumor of the enemy's presence is ferreted out; time is taken to bury the dead, and care for the wounded —sacred duties; all necessary and proper, and everything that is done has the sanction of the commanding general to its importance, and gets the emphasis of the environment. While doubt and uncertainty—polite terms for ignorance—perplex the commanding general, as to what to do and where to go, the automatic appliance is applied to all the movements "not to bring on a general engagement," and the resultant force leads the army unerringly where its necessities—food, clothing and supplies—direct it, to Frederick, its base of supplies, thus incidentally covering Washington and Harpers Ferry.

But the question is often asked, "Why were not the troops in the departments of Washington to the number of 38,000; those under Schenck to the number of 7,000; French's and Elliott's commands at Frederick and Harpers Ferry, about 10,000; those of the Susquehanna, about 15,000; department of Virginia, 41,000; department of West Virginia, 18,000—a total of 129,000 men—thrown against the Army of Northern Virginia, either during the battle, or on its re-

treat?" To those who imagine a military commander to be a Jove, with a handful of thunderbolts which he can "throw" or "hurl" against an enemy, these unrelated data naturally suggest this question; but it must be remembered that all of these troops were in the positions where adequate reasons had deemed their presence necessary. The commander of each one of these different departments, which had been carved out for him, from whatever motives, had a natural pride in the importance, the efficiency and the success of the department to which he had been assigned. Every accession of power to his department added new strength and dignity to the commander, and suggested new avenues for its employment. Every diminution of this power was liable to be interpreted into a reflection upon such a commander. No portion of the 38,000 men at Washington could be sent elsewhere until the reasons for their being thus sent overbalanced the reasons for their remaining where they were, and this reasoning applies to the inaction, if we may so express it, of these other departmental forces. In the universal ignorance of where this Southern wave was to sweep, whose premonitions of danger were felt to the limits of the extreme North, it is found that the resources and means effectively applied to its resistance were those not only accidentally within the zone of its movement, but also at the points of con-

tact; like the suppression of a fire in a house whose water-pipes, melted by the fire, pour forth the deluge which drowns the flames.

The lesson of both battles is the same—a lesson as old as the centuries, which every spirited people has taught since the dawn of history; which was fully comprehended and acted upon by the masses, when the South invaded the North as it had been when the North invaded the South; a simple question to the mass then, as it would be now, had it not been obscured by fustian and glamor; for the mass never got into the realm of forensic distinctions, but clear-eyed, saw its full meaning, and was not perplexed by the interpretations put into it since then; the question was intimate, personal, and human—the question of property and its incidents. Mr. Lincoln found no higher motive to meet the comprehension of the mass than this, in his call for seventy-five thousand men, "to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union"; nor could Mr. Curtin, when calling the Pennsylvanians, and through them their compatriots, to arms "to protect their homes, firesides, and property from devastation." Hence the intensity of the struggle. When a people's country is invaded, the people always stand ready to resist the invader.